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Abstract 
 Due to the growing sophisticated capabilities of advanced persistent cyber threats, 
it is necessary to understand and accurately assess cyber attack damage to digital assets.  
This thesis proposes a Defensive Cyber Battle Damage Assessment (DCBDA) process 
which utilizes the comprehensive understanding of all possible cyber attack 
methodologies captured in a Cyber Attack Methodology Exhaustive List (CAMEL).  This 
research proposes CAMEL to provide detailed knowledge of cyber attack actions, 
methods, capabilities, forensic evidence and evidence collection methods.  This product 
is modeled as an attack tree called the Cyber Attack Methodology Attack Tree 
(CAMAT).  The proposed DCBDA process uses CAMAT to analyze potential attack 
scenarios used by an attacker.  These scenarios are utilized to identify the associated 
digital forensic methods in CAMEL to correctly collect and analyze the damage from a 
cyber attack.  The results from the experimentation of the proposed DCBDA process 
show the process can be successfully applied to cyber attack scenarios to correctly assess 
the extent, method and damage caused by a cyber attack.  
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DEFENSIVE CYBER BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
THROUGH ATTACK METHODOLOGY MODELING 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of  a 
 hundred battles.  If you know yourself but not your enemy, for every victory 
 gained you will also suffer a defeat.  If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, 
 you will succumb in every battle." 
- Sun Tzu  
 
1.1. Motivation  
 In all manners of warfare, one must know how the enemy can attack in order to 
defend.  This knowledge can be gained through warfare planning which considers all 
aspects of the enemy's capabilities and methods of attack.  This planning is accomplished 
through the detailed analysis of the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) an attacker 
has at their disposal.  Comprehension of an adversary's attack methodology is pivotal for 
successful warfare.  Without knowing how an enemy can attack, one cannot effectively 
plan to posses the ability to defend against the attack. 
 Motivated attackers exist and have the means to penetrate and cause damage to a 
computer network.  A recent example of this nefarious ability is the 2009 cyber attack on 
2 
 
Google.  This highly sophisticated and narrowly targeted attack on Google's corporate 
infrastructure originated from China and resulted in the theft of intellectual property 
[Dru10].  This attack, codenamed Operation Aurora, utilized a previously unknown 
vulnerability exploit in Microsoft Internet Explorer aimed at specific targets through 
tailored emails [Mca10].  The exploit then downloaded and activated malware within the 
systems.  Malware is defined as software designed and/or deployed by adversaries 
without the consent or knowledge of the user in support of adversarial missions 
[DOD09].  The attack, which was initiated surreptitiously when targeted users accessed a 
reputable appearing web page, ultimately connected those computer systems to a remote 
malicious server.  The targeted nature of the attack actions and level of attack method 
sophistication of Operation Aurora are what garnered the attacker's success.  This attack 
also raised awareness to the advanced abilities of today's cyber attacker.   
 Another example of a sophisticated targeted cyber attack is Stuxnet.  Stuxnet was 
a malware attack which targeted a specific industrial control system, likely in Iran 
[FMC10] [MRH10].  These control systems operate critical national assets such as gas 
pipelines or power plants.  The apparent goal of Stuxnet was to sabotage the industrial 
facility by modifying the control systems to operate outside of their operational limits 
resulting in damage to the facility's capabilities [FMC10].  Stuxnet is considered the most 
technologically sophisticated malware developed to date [MRH10].  This malware shows 
how modern cyber attackers are using targeted, sophisticated and capable attack 
methodologies.  
 These examples show that anyone who uses computer networks must assume that 
exploitable vulnerabilities exist and will be leveraged for unauthorized use.  Simply put, 
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the enemy will attack, and will have success.  Continued network operational success is 
only possible through the ability to identify an attack, assess damage and defend against 
attacks.   
 Cyber attack damage assessment forms the foundation for the key mission impact 
questions of today's information technology-dependant leaders.  Leaders need to know 
the impact of an attack on the assets they control.  This impact assessment depends on 
accurate and timely information from a detailed technical damage assessment of an 
attack.  The attack assessment must pinpoint exactly what happened to the friendly 
targeted systems to ensure the mission impact derived from the assessment is as accurate 
as possible.   
 Knowing how the enemy can attack before they do so allows for a targeted 
detailed assessment of damage after the attack has occurred.  The intelligence preparation 
of damage assessment through cyber attack methodology analysis is the most reliable 
way to conduct active cyber damage assessments.  These defensive assessments identify 
technical damage post cyber attack.  This attack assessment process, known as Defensive 
Cyber Battle Damage Assessment (DCBDA), is vital. 
1.2. Research Statement 
 The goal of this research is to provide robust DCBDA capabilities through digital 
forensic analysis tailored by an understanding of known cyber attacks.  The ability to 
detect and assess an attack at any level of progress is vital to the successful operation of a 
digital network.  The studied abilities of the sophisticated cyber attacker show the likely 
probability that attacks will have some level of success.  It is crucial for an organization 
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to possess the ability to determine what damage a cyber attack has caused to assets in 
their control.  This critical need to perform accurate, timely and comprehensive cyber 
attack damage assessment is the motivation of this research.   
1.3. Research Approach 
 The ability to provide robust DCBDA can best be accomplished through a 
thorough, complete understanding of the attacker methodology.  This research proposes a 
DCBDA process which is comprised of two phases: a preparation phase and a forensic 
analysis phase.   
 The first phase relies on the defender's preparatory ability to understand, model, 
translate and analyze the actions and methods of the cyber attacker.  The purpose of this 
phase is to use the prepared comprehensive knowledge of the complete cyber attack 
methodology to pinpoint exact information needed to correctly identify damage for an 
active attack event assessment. 
 The second phase of the DCBDA process is forensic analysis.  This phase uses 
the information identified in the preparation phase to conduct a digital forensic analysis 
to identify evidence of actual attack damage.  Cross-referencing identified evidence with 
known cyber attack information will reveal probable attack techniques.  Once the most 
probable attack techniques are identified, DCBDA can be much more accurately 
estimated and reported.   
 In order for the preparation phase of the DCBDA process to contain the 
comprehensive knowledge of the actual attack under assessment, this research proposes 
the Cyber Attack Methodology Exhaustive List (CAMEL).  CAMEL is the detailed 
5 
 
comprehensive listing of the complete cyber attack methodology to include every known 
attack action, attack action capability metric, attack method, forensic evidence marker, 
and forensic evidence collection method.  This data is collected from researching the 
known set of all cyber attacker TTPs.  Possible sources for the attacker TTPs are forensic 
analysis white papers, ethical hacker documentation, real world reports, and personal 
experiences.  Data in the CAMEL is used to create an attack tree modeled as the Cyber 
Attack Methodology Attack Tree (CAMAT).  The CAMAT is used by the DCBDA to 
analyze attack scenarios and possible evidence for an attack event.  The diagram in 
Figure 1 is a high level view of the phases of the DCBDA process which shows the data 
flow from the CAMEL/CAMAT. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Proposed DCBDA Process. 
 
 
 This approach is broken down into three key objectives for focused effort: 
(1) Develop CAMEL and CAMAT creation process 
(2) Develop the DCBDA process 
(3) Verify the DCBDA process 
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1.3.1. Develop CAMEL and CAMAT Creation Process 
 This objective develops the process to create the CAMEL and CAMAT products.  
This process outlines the steps required to collect, record and analyze the data which 
make up these products.   
1.3.2. Develop the DCBDA Process 
 This objective seeks to design a defensive cyber technical battle damage 
assessment process which utilizes the CAMEL and CAMAT products.  This process 
outlines the steps required to assess an attack event which identifies the forensic evidence 
of the attack's technical battle damage.   
1.3.3. Verify the DCBDA Process 
 This objective seeks to verify the success the DCBDA process proposed in this 
thesis by performing DCBDA against experimental test systems.  Experimental success is 
represented by the degree to which evidence gathered from the assessment correctly 
identifies the cyber attacks executed against the test systems.  Success demonstrates that 
the proposed DCBDA process can reliably answer the following questions: 
• Did an attack occur? 
• What potential impact did the attack have? 
• What TTPs were used in the attack? 
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1.4. Thesis Organization 
 Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the research effort, including topic 
motivation, research statement, research approach and objectives, and the document's 
organization.   
 Chapter 2 provides background information on computer security incident 
analysis and the forensic analysis processes and types.  Also discussed are computer 
taxonomies, the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) process, 
attack modeling and related work.   
 Chapter 3 describes the experimental methodology.  First, the methodology 
overview is covered.  Next, the approach to build the CAMEL and CAMAT is described.  
Then the approach for the Defensive Cyber Battle Damage Assessment process is 
detailed.  The design for the experiment methodology to test DCBDA is then discussed.   
 Chapter 4 presents the details of the experiments and results.  This Section covers 
the creation of CAMEL and CAMAT, the DCBDA process and the verification of the 
DCBDA process through experimentation. 
 Chapter 5 contains a summary of the results, conclusions made from the study as 
well as recommendations for future work. 
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II. Background 
 This chapter covers the fundamental concepts and related work of cyber battle 
damage assessment research.  Section 2.1 details the steps involved in a computer 
security incident analysis.  Section 2.2 discusses the forensic analysis processes and 
types.  Section 2.3 discusses different computer attack taxonomies.  Section 2.4 covers 
the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) process.  Section 2.5 
discusses attack modeling.  Section 2.6 discusses related work.   
2.1. Computer Security Incident Analysis Process 
 There are many definitions on what comprises a computer security incident and 
the process to handle the event.  For the purposes of this thesis, the reference source for 
this topic will be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 6510.01A, 
Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense (CND) Volume I (Incident 
Handling Program) which provides guidance for the Department of Defense (DOD) 
Incident Handling Program [DOD09].  This document acknowledges the adversary threat 
cannot be completely eliminated and will likely evolve over time.  Therefore it is crucial 
to maintain a proactive, progressive, and coordinated approach to detecting and 
responding to events and incidents that can adversely affect DOD networks and systems 
[DOD09]. 
 The DOD Incident Handling Program is part of the overall CND actions to 
protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within the DOD 
computer networks.  The program outlines the methodology to provide a general 
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standardized process that establishes the intent and requirements for detecting, analyzing, 
and responding to information or technology events or incidents for the purpose of 
mitigating any adverse operational or technical impact on DOD critical data assets, 
systems, and networks. [DOD09].  Part of the incident handling methodology process is 
the incident analysis phase which is discussed in this Section.   
2.1.1. Incident Analysis 
 Incident analysis is a series of analytical steps taken to identify what happened 
from an incident.  The purpose of incident analysis is to determine and characterize the 
technical details, root causes, and potential impact of the incident.  This understanding 
will help determine what additional information to gather, coordinate information sharing 
with others, and develop a course of action for response.  This activity relies on effective 
acquisition, preservation, and timely reporting of incident data [DOD09].  The primary 
objectives for this phase include: 
• Identifying the root cause(s) of the incident through technical analysis 
• Ensuring the accuracy and completeness of incident reports 
• Characterizing and communicating the potential impact of the incident 
• Systematically capturing the methods used in the attack and the security controls 
that could prevent future occurrences 
 
• Researching actions that can be taken to respond to and eradicate the risk and/or 
threat 
• Understanding patterns of activity to characterize the threat and direct protective 
and defensive strategies 
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2.1.2.  Incident Analysis Methodology 
 This Section details the steps required for an incident analysis.  The steps are: 
gathering information, validate the incident, determine attack vector, determine system 
weaknesses, identify root causes, determine impact, research and develop courses of 
action (COAs), coordinate with others and perform correlation and trending. 
2.1.2.1. Gather information 
 In this step the objective is to identify and collect all relevant information about 
the incident for use in the analysis of the incident [DOD09].  Information gathered may 
include data previously acquired and preserved, external logs, personal accounts, all-
source intelligence, technical information, or the current operational situation.  
2.1.2.2.  Validate the incident 
 In this step the objective is to review, corroborate, and apply applicable updates to 
the reported incident to ensure all information is accurate.  Related documents should be 
reviewed and updated to maintain situational awareness, to add relevant data to 
incomplete information, or to fix erroneous information.  Report validation may require 
the review of available sources of information, such as trusted network and system logs 
of affected systems, to determine if the suspected activities happened as reported.  In this 
step it is also important to verify the incident is categorized properly [DOD09]. 
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2.1.2.3. Determine attack vector(s) 
 The data gathered in the previous steps is analyzed to determine the attack 
vector(s) used by the attacker(s).  An attack vector is the primary path or method used by 
the adversary to cause the incident or event to occur.  Attack vectors are used to 
systematically record major classes of attack methodologies used by adversaries, but do 
not identify the system-specific root causes of an incident [DOD09].  If more than one 
attack vector is identified, the attack vectors used by the threat actor must be 
distinguished as either primary or secondary.  For example, use of socially engineered e-
mail delivering a malicious payload exploiting a known vulnerability that was 
preventable [DOD09].  The primary attack vector was the payload delivered by the 
socially engineered secondary attack vector   Attack vectors should be assessed in 
accordance with Appendix A.  This annex describes the some of the possible major 
categories and sub-categories of attack vectors.  The annex should be used for assigning 
attack vectors to reportable events or incidents [DOD09]. 
2.1.2.4. Determine system weaknesses 
 In this step the objective is to analyze the gathered information from the previous 
steps to determine any underlying system weaknesses, vulnerabilities, or security controls 
that could have prevented or mitigated the impact of the incident.  Identification of 
system weaknesses is a process used to systematically record and categorize major 
classes of security controls that could prevent similar incidents from occurring in the 
future [DOD09]. 
12 
 
2.1.2.5. Identify root cause(s) 
 In this step the objective is to analyze the collected information to determine the 
system-specific base causes of the incident.  This identification expands upon the 
identified attack vectors and system weaknesses by precisely identifying the sets of 
conditions allowing the incident to occur.  For example, an attack vector may identify a 
system lacking current Operating System (OS) patches.  This is useful for correlation and 
trending, but is insufficient in identifying the specific cause of the incident and 
preventing against future occurrences.  Root cause identification would determine 
missing patches or system configurations that allowed the incident to occur [DOD09]. 
2.1.2.6. Determine impact 
 The objective of this step is to analyze the information gathered to validate and 
expand the impact assessment.  Impact is assessed based on the degree to which an 
incident or event adversely affects, or has the potential to affect, the successful 
accomplishment of operational missions of systems and networks.  In determining the 
actual impact, the current and potential impact of the incident or event on the 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of organizational operations, organizational 
assets, or individuals should be considered [DOD09].  Types of impact are either 
technical or operational. 
 Technical Impact (TI) refers to the incident’s detrimental impact on the technical 
capabilities of the organization.  TI typically refers to impacts on the network or system 
machines directly or indirectly affected by the incident.  Operational Impact (OI) refers to 
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detrimental impacts on an organization’s ability to perform its mission.  This may include 
direct and/or indirect effects that diminish or incapacitate system or network capabilities, 
the compromise and/or loss of mission critical data, or the temporary or permanent loss 
of mission critical applications or systems [DOD09].   
2.1.2.7. Research and Develop COAs 
 This step is focused on the identification of actions necessary to respond to the 
reportable event or incident, fix the system, and assess the risk for the system or network 
[DOD09].  Here multiple incident response COAs are developed and the best choice is 
selected. 
2.1.2.8. Coordinate with Others 
 An organization must work with other involved parties to collect additional 
information, obtain assistance and additional expertise or guidance, and notify 
appropriate operational and technical channels regarding changes in the status of 
reportable events, incidents, and incident handling activities.  Timely interagency 
coordination and deconfliction of operations is crucial to conducting an effective incident 
response [DOD09].   
2.1.2.9. Perform Correlation and Trending 
 In this step the objective is to analyze and identify relationships and trends 
between incidents in the short term.  A special focus on patterns is placed across long 
term incidents.  Effective and complete reporting throughout the incident handling 
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lifecycle assures that the DOD has the ability to conduct and identify these trends and 
patterns [DOD09]. 
2.2. Digital Forensics Analysis 
 Digital forensics is the application of science to the identification, collection, 
examination, and analysis, of data while preserving the integrity of the information and 
maintaining a strict chain of custody for the data [NIS06].  Chain of custody is a log of 
evidence possession and correlating time information.  The most common goal of 
performing forensics analysis is to gain a better understanding of an event of interest by 
finding and analyzing the facts related to that event [NIS06].  Listed in this Section are 
some of the various types of forensic analysis types and the basic phases of the forensic 
analysis process. 
2.2.1. Computer System Forensic Analysis  
 System analysis is the identification, acquisition, examination and analysis of all 
information from or about the affected computer systems to further incident analysis and 
understand the full scope of the incident [DOD09].  The system information to be 
analyzed typically includes anything which can help characterize the incident and 
develop courses of action.  Examples of system information are various logs, files, 
configuration settings, records of currently logged on users, past connections (logins), 
running processes, open files, and changes to files or system settings (access control lists 
(ACLs), registries, permissions) [DOD09].  Particular attention must be given to 
preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining a strict chain of custody.     
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2.2.2. Malware Forensic Analysis 
 Malware analysis is the process of identifying, analyzing, and characterizing 
reported software suspected of being malicious [DOD09].  This analysis of suspected 
malicious software is an essential step in determining the full scope of an incident.  
Malware analysis can be performed at varying degrees of depth in detail.  Depending on 
the complexity of the malware and depth of analysis required, the time necessary to 
complete the request can vary from minutes to hours to months [DOD09].   
2.2.3. Network Forensic Analysis 
 Network forensic analysis is the process of collecting, examining, and interpreting 
network traffic to identify and respond to events that violate an organization's security 
policy [DOD09].  This analysis is conducted on the assets and resources attached to the 
network or the network infrastructure.  Network analysis reveals an adversary’s use of 
network resources, uncovers the network interactions that occurred during an incident, 
and aids in discovering other affected or vulnerable systems. 
2.2.4. Forensic Analysis Process 
 This Section describes the basic phases of the forensic analysis process: 
collection, examination, analysis, and reporting.  This process is depicted in Figure 2. 
2.2.4.1. Collection 
 The first phase in the forensic analysis process is to identify, label, record, and 
acquire data from the possible sources of relevant data, while following guidelines and 
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procedures that preserve the integrity of the data [NIS06].  Collection is typically 
performed in a timely manner because of the likelihood of losing dynamic data such as 
current network connections, as well as losing data from volatile devices.  Data 
acquisition of the identified data sources for the collection phase of the forensic analysis 
process should be performed using a three-step process: developing a plan to acquire the 
data, acquiring the data, and verifying the integrity of the acquired data [NIS06].   
 
 
Figure 2.  The Forensic Analysis Process [NIS06]. 
 
2.2.4.2. Examination 
 After the data has been collected, the next phase is to examine the data.  This 
involves forensically processing the potentially large amounts of collected data using a 
combination of automated and manual methods to assess and extract data of particular 
interest, while preserving the integrity of the data analyzed [NIS06].  The extracted data 
is then further analyzed using forensic tools and techniques appropriate to the type of 
information collected. 
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2.2.4.3. Analysis 
 The next phase of the process is to analyze and interpret the results of the 
examination, using legally justifiable methods and techniques.  The objective of this 
analysis is to derive useful information which forms conclusions to the questions that 
were the impetus for performing the collection and examination [NIS06]. 
2.2.4.4. Reporting 
 The final phase of the forensic process is reporting the results of the conducted 
analysis.  This report may include describing the actions used and explaining how tools 
and procedures were selected.  Determining what other actions need to be performed such 
as a forensic examination of additional data sources, securing identified vulnerabilities, 
and improving existing security controls should also be reported in this phase.  The 
formality and verbosity of the reporting step varies greatly depending on the situation 
[NIS06].   
2.3. Computer Attack Taxonomy 
 In the effort to understand the digital computer attack, it is useful to understand 
the process of the attack which is being studied.  In order to do this efficiently, it is 
worthwhile to classify the distinct elements which make up the attack.  This classification 
allows research efforts to focus on distinct areas of the attack in great detail.  A common 
method for doing this in computer science is with a taxonomy.  Taxonomy is the process, 
or science, of a classification scheme that partitions a body of knowledge and defines the 
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relationship of the pieces [Bos02].  Classification is the process of using a criterion for 
ordering information into groups or categories.  Originally used for classifying 
organisms, the principles of the classification process apply to computer security incident 
research via taxonomy.  There are many characteristics of taxonomy, and a small set of 
those is listed below [Amo94]: 
• Mutually exclusive.  Classification in one category excludes all others 
• Exhaustive.  Taken together, the categories include all possibilities 
• Unambiguous.  Data should be clear and precise so that classification is not 
uncertain, regardless of who is classifying 
• Repeatable.  Repeated applications result in the same classification 
• Accepted.  Logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved 
through review 
• Useful.  The process can be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry 
2.3.1. Target-Centric Ontology for Intrusion Detection 
 In 2002 Undercoffer and Pinkston from the University of Maryland Baltimore 
County defined a target-based ontology for intrusion detection [UnP02].  In this paper 
they devise a simple taxonomy and from it develop their ontology.  They argue that 
ontologies provide software systems with the ability to share a common understanding of 
the information at issue in turn enabling the software system with a greater ability to 
reason over and analyze this information [UnP02].  What is unique, outside of their focus 
on ontology, is that their model is target centric.  Their developed ontology is a model of 
computer attacks categorized by: the system component targeted, the means and 
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consequence of attack, and the location of the attacker [UnP02].  This Section focuses on 
their efforts to define attack taxonomy.  
 Their research states that an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has no knowledge 
of the attacker’s motivation or the tools employed to conduct the attack.  The IDS needs 
to focus on evaluating the attack information which it has the ability to observe.  Their 
taxonomy is classified from the point of view of an IDS according to features and 
characteristics directly observable at the target.  The first section for the taxonomy is the 
system component targeted by the attack.  Table 1 breaks down how the taxonomy 
defines the categories of targets. 
Table 1.  Target of Attack Categories [UnP02]. 
 
Target Explanation Example 
Network The attack is inclusive of the layers of the 
protocol stack, but does not leave the 
protocol stack 
SynFlood attack 
Kernel-
Space 
A process executing as part of the 
operating system, either compiled into the 
kernel or a module that is loaded into and 
executed by the kernel 
Heap overflow 
Application An application running outside of kernel 
space 
Apache Web Server Chunk 
Handling vulnerability 
Other Any component not included above Printers, modems, etc. 
 
 
 The next section of the target-centric taxonomy is the means of attack.  The 
means of attack categories are summarized in Table 2.  This category is further divided as 
input validation, exploits and configuration.  Input validation vulnerabilities exists if 
some type of malformed input is received by a hardware or software component and is 
not properly bounded or checked.  Exploits are vulnerabilities such as race conditions or 
20 
 
undefined states in a hardware or software component that lead to performance 
degradation and/or system compromise.  Configuration vulnerabilities exist due to an 
improper state adjustment to a software program.   
Table 2.  Means of Attack Categories [UnP02]. 
 
Category Type Description 
Input 
Validation 
Buffer Overflow Overflow of a static-sized data structure. 
Boundary 
Condition Error 
A process attempts to read or write beyond a valid 
address boundary or a system resource is 
exhausted 
Malformed 
Input 
A process accepts syntactically incorrect input, 
extraneous input fields, or the process lacks the 
ability to handle field-value correlation errors 
Exploits Exceptional 
Condition 
An error resulting from the failure to handle an 
exceptional condition generated by a functional 
module or device 
Race Condition An error occurring during a timing window 
between two operations 
Serialization 
Error 
An error that results from the improper 
serialization of operations 
Atomicity Error An error occurring when a partially-modified data 
structure is used by another process 
Configuration General Vulnerabilities that result from some mis-
configuration or lack of proper configuration 
 
 The taxonomy outlines the consequences and locations of attacks.  The categories 
for the consequences of attacks are listed in Table 3. The consequences of an attack are 
the end results of the attack.   
 The location of an attack is the physical location of the attacker.  The location 
categories are outlined in Table 4.  These categories are indicated by whether the attacker 
is connected via the network or local host.   
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Table 3.  Consequence Categories [UnP02]. 
 
Category Description 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) 
The attack results in a Denial of a Service to the users of the 
system 
User Access The attack results in the attacker having access to some services 
on the target system 
Root Access The attack results in the attacker having complete control of the 
system 
Loss of 
Confidentiality 
The attack results in the users of the system loosing privacy of 
their data 
Other The attack results in the compromise of data integrity or other 
undesirable characteristic 
 
 
Table 4.  Location Categories [UnP02]. 
 
Category Description 
Remote The attacker does not need to be “virtually” present at the target 
Local The attacker needs to be “virtually” present at the target 
Remote/Local The attacker may be either local or remote to the target 
 
2.3.2. The Howard Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy 
 Starting as a thesis for a PhD at Carnegie Mellon University and later refined as a 
Sandia National Laboratories report, Howard introduced a computer security incident 
taxonomy [How97] [HoL98].  Figure 3 represents the entirety of the taxonomy.  The 
taxonomy breaks down a computer and network incident into three main parts; the 
attacker, the attack(s) and the objective.  The taxonomy then further adds fidelity to the 
nature and makeup of an attack.  This taxonomy can be classified as a process schema 
22 
 
attack taxonomy.  It is important to note that the terms enumerated for the categories in 
the taxonomy are not intended as a comprehensive dictionary of terms.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Howard Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy [HoL98]. 
 
 
 An attack on a computer or network can be classified as an incident.  Figure 4 
depicts the three parts of an incident and how one or more attacker achieves their 
objectives.  An incident can be defined as a group of attacks that can be distinguished 
from other attacks because of the distinctiveness of the attackers, attacks, objectives, sites 
and timing [HoL98].  The attack may be prosecuted by only one attacker or a group of 
several attackers related by some objective or other means.  From an operational 
viewpoint, an attacker on a computer attempts to reach their ultimate objectives though 
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some "means, ways, and ends" that connect the attacker to the objective [How97].  The 
means used by the attacker are the tools, access and results an attacker achieves.   
 
 
Figure 4.  Simplified Computer and Network Incident [HoL98]. 
2.3.2.1. Attacker 
 Howard defines an attacker as an individual who attempts one or more attacks in 
order to achieve an objective.  Table 5 lists the categories of attackers used by Howard.   
 
Table 5.  Howard's Attacker Categories [HoL98]. 
 
Category Description 
Hackers   For challenge, status or the thrill of obtaining access 
Spies For information to be used for political gain 
Terrorists Cause fear for political gain 
Corporate Raiders  Attack competitor's computers for financial gain 
Professional Criminals Personal financial gain 
Vandals Cause damage 
Voyeur Thrill of obtaining sensitive information 
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2.3.2.2. Attack 
 An attack is a series of steps taken by an attacker to produce an event which 
achieves an unauthorized result [HoL98].  Howard's taxonomy breaks down an attack 
into five parts: tool, vulnerability, action, target, and unauthorized result.     
 The first two steps in an attack, the tool and vulnerability, are used to create an 
event on a computer or network system.  A category listing of tools can is shown in Table 
6.  A list of vulnerabilities and their descriptions are found in Table 7.  During an attack, 
an attacker uses a tool to exploit a vulnerability that causes a desired action against a 
target.  A tool is some means that can be used to exploit a vulnerability in a computer or 
network [HoL98].  A tool can be simple or sophisticated in its execution.  A vulnerability 
is some weakness in a system that allows an unintended event or unauthorized action to 
occur.  An attack is comprised of one or more vulnerabilities that are exploited by an 
attacker using one or more tools. 
 An event is an action directed at a target which is intended to result in a change of 
state, or status, of the target [HoL98].  Howard's action categories are found in Table 8.  
In order for there to be an event, there must be an action that is taken against a target.  
This brings the breakdown of an event into the separate items of an action and target.  An 
action is a step taken by a user or process in order to achieve a result.  The action must be 
directed against a target, but the action does not have to succeed in changing the state of 
the target.     
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Table 6.  Howard's Tool Categories [HoL98]. 
 
Category Description 
Physical attack A means of physically stealing or damaging a computer, 
network, its components, or its supporting systems 
Information 
exchange 
A means of obtaining information either from other attackers or 
from the people being attacked 
User command A means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering commands to 
a process through direct user input at the process interface 
Script or program A means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering commands to 
a process through the execution of a file of commands (script) 
or a program at the process interface 
Autonomous agent A means of exploiting a vulnerability by using a program, or 
program fragment, which operates independently from the user 
Toolkit A software package which contains scripts, programs, or 
autonomous agents that exploit vulnerabilities 
Distributed tool A tool that can be distributed to multiple hosts, which can then 
be coordinated to anonymously perform an attack on the target 
host simultaneously after some time delay 
Data tap A means of monitoring the electromagnetic radiation 
emanating from a computer or network using an external 
device 
 
Table 7.  Howard's Vulnerability Categories [HoL98]. 
 
Category Description 
Design 
vulnerability 
A vulnerability in the design of hardware or software whereby even 
a perfect implementation will result in a vulnerability 
Implementation 
vulnerability 
A vulnerability resulting from an error made in the software or 
hardware implementation of a satisfactory design 
Configuration 
vulnerability 
A vulnerability resulting from an error in the configuration of a 
system 
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Table 8.  Howard's Action Categories [HoL98]. 
 
Category Description 
Probe Access a target in order to determine its characteristics 
Scan Access a set of targets sequentially in order to identify which targets 
have a specific characteristic 
Flood Access a target repeatedly in order to overload the target’s capacity 
Authenticate Present an identity of someone to a process and, if required, verify that 
identity, in order to access a target 
Bypass Avoid a process by using an alternative method to access a target 
Spoof Masquerade by assuming the appearance of a different entity in network 
communications 
Read Obtain the content of data in a storage device, or other data medium 
Copy Reproduce a target leaving the original target unchanged 
Steal Take possession of a target without leaving a copy in the original 
location 
Modify Change the content or characteristics of a target 
Delete Remove a target, or render it irretrievable 
 
 A target is some form of data found on a computer or a network system.  An event 
is the logical linkage between an action and a specific target of which an action is 
directed [HoL98].  A list of target categories is found in Table 9.   
 The last part of an attack is the result, or more specifically the desired 
unauthorized result.  The possible unauthorized results for Howard's taxonomy are listed 
in Table 10.  An unauthorized result is the logical ending of a successful attack.  This is 
an important distinction in this taxonomy.  If the result was authorized it could not be the 
result of an attack.   
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Table 9.  Howard's Target Categories [HoL98]. 
 
Category Description 
Account A domain of user access on a computer or network which is controlled 
according to a record of information which contains the user’s account 
name, password and use restrictions 
Process A program in execution, consisting of the executable program, the 
program’s data and stack, its program counter, stack pointer and other 
registers, and all other information needed to execute the program 
Data Representations of facts, concepts, or instructions in a manner suitable 
for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by 
automatic means 
Component One of the parts that make up a computer or network 
Computer A device that consists of one or more associated components, including 
processing units and peripheral units, that is controlled by internally 
stored programs, and that can perform substantial computations, 
including numerous arithmetic operations, or logic operations, without 
human intervention during execution 
Network An interconnected or interrelated group of host computers, switching 
elements, and interconnecting branches 
Internetwork A network of networks 
2.3.2.1. Objective 
 The objective is the purpose or end goal of an incident.  Table 11 depicts 
Howard's attack taxonomy objective categories.  The objective categorizes the efforts, or 
results, of the attacker's actions.   
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Table 10.  Howard's Unauthorized Result Categories [HoL98]. 
 
Category Description 
Increased access An unauthorized increase in the domain of access on a computer or 
network 
Disclosure of 
information 
Dissemination of information to anyone who is not authorized to 
access that information 
Corruption of 
information 
Unauthorized alteration of data on a computer or network 
Denial of service Intentional degradation or blocking of computer or network 
resources 
Theft of 
resources 
Unauthorized use of computer or network resources 
 
Table 11.  Howard's Objective Categories [HoL98]. 
 
Category Description 
Challenge, status, thrill No motivation outside of completing attack 
Political gain Attack against a government target 
Financial gain Market advantage from actions on target 
Damage Unauthorized modification or destruction to target 
 
 
2.3.3. Landwehr et al: A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws 
 In a paper which conducted a comprehensive survey of computer program 
security flaw taxonomies, Landwehr et al. proposed a new security flaw taxonomy 
[LBM93].  The paper describes a taxonomy as not simply a neutral structure for 
categorizing specimens, but an organized theory of flaws to which we seek answers.  
From this definition the paper broke down the study of computer attacks into three 
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categories:  flaws by genesis, time of introduction, and location [LBM93].  The taxonomy 
asks these essential questions of each observed flaw, or attack: 
• How did it enter the system? 
• When did it enter the system? 
• Where in the system is it manifest? 
2.3.3.1. Flaws By Genesis 
 The strategies used to avoid, detect or compensate for accidental flaws are 
different than those introduced intentionally.  Table 12 shows the how flaws by genesis 
may be introduced intentionally or inadvertently [LBM93].  For example, increasing the 
resources devoted to code reviews and testing may be effective in reducing the number of 
accidental flaws.  Intentional flaws can be categorized as malicious or non-malicious.  A 
malicious flaw is the purposeful advantage of a security flaw in a system.  A non-
malicious flaw is the intentional introduction of a flaw.  This is usually a system service 
or other computer system function used by a program for non degradation use.  An 
example is a covert channel, which does not harm the host computer system.  An 
inadvertent flaw in software is a flaw that remained undetected through the testing and 
development phase.  There should be no knowledge of this flaw until it is inadvertently 
discovered.      
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Table 12.  Flaws by Genesis [LBM93]. 
 
Genesis 
Intentional 
Malicious 
Trojan Horse 
Trapdoor 
Logic/Time Bomb 
Non-Malicious Covert Channel Other 
Inadvertent 
Validation Error 
Domain Error 
Serialization/Aliasing 
Identification/Authentication Inadequate 
Boundary Condition Violation 
Other Exploitable Logic Error 
 
2.3.3.2. Flaws by Time of Introduction 
 In this Section the software development cycle is explained as a vector for flaws 
as shown in Table 13.  This cycle gives a time factor to how software is produced and an 
understanding on when certain flaws may occur.  The paper introduces three distinct 
activities that fit the time taxonomy: during development, during maintenance, and 
during operation.  During the development phase, requirements are specified and a design 
is constructed.  This is the groundwork for all future development of this piece of 
software.  If a flaw is not considered or discovered here, it will matriculate into the 
software program.  
 During the development, the source code is developed.  Without proper testing, 
the human-crafted code could hold potential flaws.  This is also true for the object code.  
During the maintenance phase the introduced flaws are often attributed to a programmer's 
failure to understand the system as whole.  Flaws fixed during maintenance in this way 
tend to introduce more flaws.  During operation one should consider the introduction of 
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unauthorized modifications during software use.  Any change vector from a virus to 
ordinary users may be able to modify the software and introduce flaws.   
Table 13.  Flaws by Time of Introduction [LBM93]. 
 
Time of 
Introduction 
During 
Development 
Requirement/Specification/Design 
Source Code 
Object Code 
During Maintenance 
During Operation 
 
2.3.3.3. Flaws by Location 
 In this Section the concept of spatiality is introduced.  This is a flaw which can be 
classified according to where in the system it is introduced or found [LBM93].  Table 14 
shows how the flaws by location are deconstructed.  Most flaws occur in software, but 
they can also occur in hardware as well.  Software spatiality is divided into operating 
system, support and application.  Operating systems are defined as a system which 
handled memory and processor allocation, process management, device handling, file 
management, and accounting [LBM93].   
 This layout is chosen by [LBM93] because it matches the typical layout of known 
operating systems.  The support program category is the other programs which interface 
with the software including: compilers, editors, databases and other non operating system 
programs.  The application software is a category for programs that have no special 
system privileges.     
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Table 14.  Flaws by Location [LBM93]. 
 
Location Software 
Operating 
System 
System Initialization 
Memory Management 
Process Management/Scheduling 
Device Management 
File Management 
Identification/Authentication 
Other/Unknown 
Support Privileged Utilities Unprivileged Utilities 
Application 
Hardware 
 
2.4. Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) 
 According to AFPAM 14-118, IPOE is a rigorous analytical methodology focused 
on providing predictive intelligence to warfighters at the right time for use in planning 
and executing operations [DAF08].  The steps of the AF IPOE process are outlined in this 
Section in detail and depicted graphically in Figure 5.   
 
Figure 5.  IPOE Cycle [DAF08]. 
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 IPOE shifts the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) focus from a 
reactive mode of "discovery" to one where the emphasis is to predict and confirm 
adversary actions and inject decision-quality information where it can support the 
commander's objectives [DAF08].  IPOE drives planning, is predictive, actionable, 
understandable, timely, relevant and tailored.  IPOE allows analysts, through observation 
of adversary actions and behaviors over time, to develop an in-depth cultural, behavioral, 
and situational understanding of the adversary.  The basic steps in the IPOE process 
remain the same, regardless of the level of military operations.  The battlespace, or 
operational, environment is the first area of focus for the process. 
2.4.1. Step 1: Define the Operational Environment 
 The first step of the AF IPOE process focuses effort on defining areas and 
characteristics of the operational environment that most influence campaign or mission 
execution.  This definition bounds the intelligence problem and highlights, for further 
analysis, significant characteristics of the operating environment that may influence 
available COAs or leaders decisions.  Defining the operational environment is 
accomplished by following the below steps [DAF08].  
(1) Analyze the mission 
(2) Identify the amount of detail that is required and achievable within the time 
available for IPOE 
 
(3) Identify the limits of the operational area (OA) 
(4) Determine the significant characteristics of the OA 
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(5) Establish the limits of the area of interest (AOI) 
(6) Determine the dimensions of the operational environment 
(7) Identify intelligence gaps and priorities 
(8) Collect the required material and intelligence necessary to complete the remainder 
of the IPOE process 
 
2.4.2. Step 2: Describe the Operational Environment Effects 
 The second step in the IPOE process determines how the operational environment 
may affect both adversary and friendly operations.  Predicting potential adversary COAs 
and developing friendly COAs is an important part of the planning process [DAF08].  
The operational environment helps or hinders both the adversary and friendly forces 
when considering these COAs.  The primary purpose of this step is determining how the 
operational environment may affect, positively or negatively, both adversary and friendly 
operations [DAF08].  This step is broken down into four steps outlined below. 
(1) Analyze the physical environment 
(2) Analyze the effects of weather 
(3) Analyze the human dimension 
(4) Describe and depict the effects of the physical environment, weather and the 
human dimension on friendly and adversary operations 
 
2.4.3. Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary 
 This step involves a detailed study of adversary forces in order to determine the 
tactics, strengths and weaknesses of the adversary.  This evaluation is also used to 
understand how the enemy typically will behave according to their employed doctrine 
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and tactics.  The products of this step may vary depending on the depth of the IPOE 
analysis being performed, but generally will include identifying enemy centers of gravity 
(COGs) and critical vulnerabilities (CVs) [DAF08].  The main purpose of this step is to 
use the evaluation to predict potential COAs for step 4 of the IPOE process.  This step is 
broken down into four phases outlined below. 
(1) Identify and analyze adversary COG/CV 
(2) Create or update threat and other models 
(3) Determine the current adversary situation 
(4) Identify adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities 
2.4.4. Step 4: Determine Adversary Courses of Action 
 The purpose of step 4 is to analyze potential adversary COAs and identify 
develop, and prioritize likely adversary COAs to support friendly COA developments 
that can be exploited to shape the operational environment and accomplish the friendly 
mission [DAF08].  This step is broken down into six phases outlined below. 
(1) Explicitly identify assumptions 
(2) Identify the adversary’s likely objectives and desired end state 
(3) Develop COAs based on adversary perception of friendly disposition 
(4) Identify the full set of potential COAs available to the adversary 
(5) Identify and nominate targets valuable to the adversary executing probable COAs 
(6) Identify and nominate collection requirements that monitor potential COAs and 
key operational environment characteristics 
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2.5. Attack Modeling 
 Attack modeling is a structured design geared towards understanding the 
complexities of a security incident, such as a computer or network attack.  This is the 
method for portraying system states, vulnerabilities, exploits and attacker actions.  These 
models grant analysts the ability to digest the vast amount of details which comprise a 
modern computer attack.   
2.5.1. Attack Tree Modeling 
 Attack trees are diagrams which model the threat of an attack conducted by an 
adversary against any type of target.  The attack tree modeling concept for computer 
security threats was developed by Bruce Schneier [Sch99].  His attack tree hierarchy 
modeling provides a formal, methodical way of describing the security of systems, based 
on varying attacks.  This modeling system offers the ability to decompose, visualize and 
determine the methods of an attack.  Essentially, the attack tree enumerates the methods 
an attacker uses to reach a goal or objective.   
 The root node of the modeled tree represents the goal of the attack.  Each node in 
the tree represents a set of sub-goals that must be achieved in order for the top level goal 
to succeed [LHS03].  Traversing the tree from each leaf of the root node will reveal a 
potential attack methodology used by the attacker to reach the goal.  It is also important 
to note that an attack tree, or its parts, can become part of a larger attack tree and as such 
is reusable.   
 The four major components of an attack tree are: Root, AND, OR and Leaf.  The 
root node is the goal of the attacker, such as gaining unauthorized access to a target 
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system.  The AND nodes and OR nodes operate in a manner similar to AND/OR logic 
gates.  The AND node is only possible if all the children nodes are possible.  Essentially 
all sub-goals must be met in order to achieve the AND node.  An OR node is possible if 
one or more of the children nodes are possible to achieve.   
 Figure 6 is a simple attack tree of an attacker whose goal is to open a safe.  The 
Figure shows AND and OR nodes, with only AND nodes marked.  This example 
demonstrates how each node becomes a sub-goal, and the children of that node are ways 
to achieve that sub-goal [Sch99].  The example also includes values assigned to the 
various leaf nodes, I (impossible) and P (possible).  From these values calculations for the 
security of the goal, or feasibility of attack, can be made.  Any value, or metric, can be 
assigned to the leaf nodes and then propagated up the tree structure in the same manner: 
easy versus difficult, expensive versus inexpensive, intrusive versus nonintrusive, legal 
versus illegal, special equipment required versus no special equipment [Sch99].  Any 
metric that is placed on the tree graph can be used to show if an attack methodology is 
feasible per the goal and the metric given.   
 Creation of an attack tree model requires expertise about the attack that is to be 
modeled.  The goal and all sub-goals need to be understood in order to make the model 
worthwhile.  The first step in creating an attack tree is to identify all possible attack goals.  
Each goal forms a separate tree, although they might share sub trees and nodes.  Next 
identify all attacks against the goals, and add them to the respective tree.  Repeat this step 
until all attacks against these goals are listed.  Note that sub-goals of a given goal can 
form their own respective attack tree model.   
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 Building a complete attack tree gives the ability to analyze and research the 
security decisions that have to be made for attack.  The model will show the behaviors of 
the attacker and how they will act.  Therefore a security reaction, response and handling 
plan for those decisions can be made.  The model can be shown graphically or done in 
simple text as Figure 7 shows.  Overall, the attack tree will give an analyst a 
comprehensive look at the knowledge, methodology and tactics of an attacker through 
their eyes. 
 
Figure 6.  Example Attack Tree of a Physical Safe [Sch99]. 
 
2.5.2. Attack Tree Metrics and Analysis 
 Creating an attack tree gives insight into all the possible attack methods an 
attacker can use to reach their goal.  A simple analysis is conducted by starting at each 
leaf node and traversing up the tree to the root node.  Each leaf node traversal will reveal 
a potential attack methodology.  Moving past this simple analysis requires more 
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information be included in the attack tree model.  This additional information, or metrics, 
added to a node is considered weighting the nodes.  These metrics can be anything 
quantifiable such as probability, success, cost, risk, or damage.  Typically three or four 
metrics are used [Ame04].  Too few indicators lead to a flat, one-dimensional 
understanding of the forces that drive incidents.  Too many metrics can confuse the 
analysis.  Ideally, indicators should be orthogonal.  This means that the quantifiable 
influence of one indicator is independent of another.  Overall these metrics are considered 
the capabilities of an attacker. 
 The metrics associated with a node are defined as capabilities.  Capability 
analysis of a tree model consists of analyzing each of the nodes and determining the 
value of the metrics to be assigned to the node.  Through further analysis, this will 
determine the likelihood of the attacks.  These resource metrics can be considered 
behavioral indicators because they influence the behavior of adversaries [Ame05].  
Capabilities-based analysis of attack trees is rooted on a very simple premise about 
attackers’ behavior: if they want to and they have the capability to do so then they will 
[Ame05].  In other words, if adversaries exist that have the motivation to harm the 
system, the resources needed to carry out the exploits and a willingness to accept the 
potential consequences of their actions, then, at some time, they will carry out an attack 
on the system. 
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Figure 7.  Text Attack Tree Example [Sch99]. 
 
2.5.2.1. Attack Scenarios 
 An attack scenario is a particular path, or set of paths, through an attack tree that 
leads from a minimal set of one or more leaf nodes to the root [Ame04].  An attack 
scenario is the simple analysis as discussed in the previous Section.  It is minimal in the 
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sense that, if any of the leaf events are removed from the path, then the root cannot be 
achieved.  Attack scenarios can be found for an entire attack tree.  The complete set of 
attack scenarios for an attack tree shows all of the attacks that are available to an attacker 
who possesses near infinite resources, capabilities and motivation. [Ame05].  
2.5.2.2. Attack Tree pruning 
 An attack tree contains all possible methods to achieve the root goal.  Analyzing 
each of these attack scenarios of an attack tree for a given attack can lead to time 
inefficiencies.  These wasteful considerations are caused by analyzing attack paths which 
are outside or not representative of the capabilities of the attacker.  An objective, 
quantitative measurement of the scenarios must be applied to the attack tree in order to 
alleviate this waste.  The determination of the least likely scenarios is the pruning 
process. 
 Pruning determines whether or not a particular attack scenario in the tree model 
should be considered for further analysis.  This consideration is determined from an 
analysis on each attack scenario as to whether a particular type of threat agent has the 
resources required to reach the goal of the scenario [Ame04].  This act of pruning reduces 
the attack analysis space.  It should be noted that while pruning makes analysis easier, it 
also can remove viable attack vectors and may potentially leave defenders unprepared. 
2.5.3. Attack Tree Drawbacks 
 The attack tree is only a model, and as such it is only as good as the data it is built 
from.  Any data not included, wrongfully identified or incorrectly modeled can have an 
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adverse effect on end results.  Also, though a comprehensive attack tree is alluring, it is 
not always the best choice.  The complexity and upkeep of the data has the potential to 
become overwhelming.  The more thorough an attack tree, the more complex it becomes 
which, limits its illustrative nature [Kar05].  There is a delicate balance of complexity and 
usability that can hinder the models effectiveness. 
2.6. Related work 
 This Section covers related work in the cyber battle damage field of study.  The 
following research topics focus on damage and impact assessment.     
2.6.1. The Horony Damage Assessment Model 
 In 1999, Captain Mark D. Horony developed an Information System (IS) incident 
Damage Assessment Model (DAM) tailored to the needs of the IS manager's organization 
[Hor99].  This model is shown graphically in Figure 8.  The model was designed to be 
part of a IS manager's toolkit to ensure a full and accurate damage assessment has been 
accomplished for security incident response [Hor99].  The processes of a business are the 
foundation for the DAM.  The manager of an IS must define these processes and how 
they relate to the information systems of their control.   
 Horony based the incident assessment process on eight primary factors listed 
below.  Each of these is further expanded into sub-factors which better define and explain 
the primary factors [Hor99].   
(1) Recovery 
(2) Education/Training 
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(3) Business Expenses 
(4) Productivity 
(5) Data 
(6) Lost Revenue 
(7) Reputation 
(8) Human Life   
 
Figure 8.  Horony IS DAM [Hor99]. 
 
2.6.1.1. Recovery 
 Recovery is the process that a system administrator must take to restore an IS to 
the most current state prior to an incident [Hor99].  The operations to support recovery 
44 
 
include backups, manual data input, and repair of damaged software or hardware.  
Recovery is a factor which includes all issues that must be accomplished to restore the IS 
to the previous working state [Hor99].  The sub-factors for Recovery defined by Horony 
are listed below.     
(1) Investigation 
(2) Restore 
(3) Software /Hardware 
(4) Consultants/Contractors 
(5) Accounts 
2.6.1.2. Education/Training 
 Education and training is a necessary factor when considering the various 
business processes and information systems a user must understand [Hor99].  During the 
course of an incident investigation the need for additional education and training within 
the organization may become evident.  System administrators and information security 
personnel may not have the necessary skills to perform a thorough investigation [Hor99].  
As new procedures and processes are implemented in an organization, so too does the 
need to implement training and education of the systems.  A goal of this training is to 
reduce the overall chance of future incidents.  The sub-factors of Education and Training 
are listed below. 
(1) System Administrator/Information Security Personnel 
(2) Employee Computer and Information Security 
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2.6.1.3. Business Expenses 
 Business Expenses are the direct fees or costs that result from outages, which 
affect customers and other businesses [Hor99].  An IS incident impacts the business 
process of an organization, and as a result causes cost factors from IS outages.  The two 
sub-factors of Business Expenses are listed below. 
(1) Customer Service 
(2) Business to Business 
2.6.1.4. Productivity 
 When an information systems' performance is degraded, the productivity of an 
organization will be impacted [Hor99].  An organization's business processes must be 
determined and understood in order to evaluate how the organizations productivity will 
be impacted during and IS incident.  Productivity has three sub-factors listed below. 
(1) Mission Impact 
(2) Downtime 
(3) Communication 
2.6.1.5. Data 
 Data lost as a result of an information incident must be evaluated for the ability 
and cost of recovery [Hor99].  The impact of how an organization handles data, from 
storage to usage, must be evaluated as a result from an IS incident.  This impact must be 
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understood in order to lessen the impact of future events.  The sub-factors of Data are 
listed below. 
(1) Restoring 
(2) Re-Entering 
(3) Unrecoverable Data 
(4) Proprietary Data 
2.6.1.6. Lost Revenue 
 If a system is damaged it is necessary to evaluate how it will impact the revenue 
generating process of the organization [Hor99].  There are two sub-factors to consider for 
Lost Revenue listed below. 
(1) Lost Sales 
(2) Lost Customers   
2.6.1.7. Reputation 
 Reputation is an overarching opinion of a company.  This factor can be impacted 
from an IS incident.  This can in turn impact customers, employees, revenue and other 
aspects of an organization [Hor99].  While difficult to quantify, the incident assessment 
must include considerations for the reputation of the impacted organization.  Reputation 
has two sub-factors listed below. 
(1) Consumer/Public Confidence 
(2) Quality Employees 
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2.6.1.8. Human Life 
 The consideration toward the human life factor in an organization is very 
important.  An IS may support life saving assets or missions.  The morale and personal 
life of information security personnel who respond to incidents must also be considered.  
The basic fact to factor is that the quality and standards of human life depend on IS and 
may be impacted by an organization's security incident.  The sub-factors of human life 
are listed below.     
(1) Loss of Life 
(2) High work load of Emergency Response Team members 
2.6.2. Fortson Case Study of Damage Assessment  
 In 2007 Captain Larry W. Fortson established a conceptual operations-focused 
methodological framework that facilitates effective defensive cyber damage and mission 
impact assessment and reporting following cyber-based information incidents [For07].  
The research focused on the relationship of damage assessment and mission impact.  The 
research used historical analysis and case study methodology for data collection through 
literature review, examination of existing case study research and interviews with Air 
Force members and civilian personnel employed as experts in cyber damage and mission 
impact assessment of Air Force networks [For07].  
 The research found that damage assessment is conducted in a disjointed manner 
and in many cases is limited to technical or economic reporting with no real assessment 
of damage in terms of value loss [For07].  Damage assessment must consist of both a 
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technical assessment and a damage assessment that measures a cyber value loss.  The 
prevailing theme throughout the research was the need to refocus the fixation on 
technology to allow a more comprehensive understanding mission impact assessment 
[For07]. 
 Fortson states that damage from a successful cyber attack may be measured 
effectively only if the value of the asset is known before the incident.  Fortson's research 
also found that Air Force organizations are not looking at the right assets for damage 
assessment, due largely to a failure to recognize what assets support the mission [For07].   
An organization must be able to identify the correct assets which support their mission.  
They must also be able to articulate a value of the asset in order to provide substantial 
damage assessment.  It is through an organization's ability to identify and value an asset 
before an incident occurs that cyber damage assessment is possible. 
 Fortson introduced the Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment 
(CDA-D/MIA) as an improved methodology over existing mechanisms.  The CDA-
D/MIA methodology is intended to assess damage and mission impact in the organization 
where the incident occurred and provide rapid reporting of the assessment results to the 
local decision maker, NETOPS command and control structure, and the appropriate 
interested report consumers [For07].  
  In his framework, Fortson shows how an Incident Response Agent conducts a 
technical damage assessment which is a separate report from the mission impact 
assessment.  This data flow of the technical damage assessment is depicted in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9.  CDA-D/MIA Incident and Impact Reporting [For07]. 
 
  Based on these technical assessments the information owner can begin to 
estimate damage by comparing the amount of critical information asset exposure to the 
threat. The information owner and the incident response agent work together to determine 
if the threat has resulted in any damage [For07]. 
 Fortson's research showed that mission impact assessment is too focused on the 
technical damage assessment and lacks a vehicle for comprehensive understanding of 
mission impact due to digital asset degradation.  Fortson does not design a methodology 
for technical damage assessment, rather a framework for mission incident and impact 
assessment.  The purpose of network defense is to protect the information assets on the 
network and Fortson's framework seeks to give the defenders the avenue to communicate 
how those assets are impacted by a security incident.   
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2.6.1. Investigating Computer Attacks Using Attack Trees 
 In 2007 Poolsapassit and Ray introduce an attack-tree based filtering algorithm 
that eliminates information from a log file that is not related to an attack being 
investigated and extracts evidence corresponding to a particular source's role in the attack 
[PoR07].  The research describes an automated attack-tree-based approach for filtering 
irrelevant information from system log files and conducting systematic investigations of 
computer attacks. 
 The research defines an "augmented attack tree," which extends the basic attack 
tree by associating each branch of the tree with a sequence of malicious operations that 
could have contributed to the attack [PoR07].  Figure 10 shows how an augmented attack 
tree may be used to support a forensic investigation. 
 
Figure 10.  Log File Investigation Process [PoR07].   
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 To conduct a forensic investigation the augmented attack tree is first used to 
generate the set of incidents corresponding to all the attack signatures for the system 
[PoR07].  Each edge in the attack tree specifies an attack signature.  Each attack signature 
is a collection of several incidents.  Then a log file filtering algorithm sequentially 
executes queries to extract suspicious activities, from non-suspicious ones, from an 
original log file from the attack.  The algorithm starts at the root node of the attack tree.  
It traverses every edge incident to the root node.  For each step in the attack signature, the 
algorithm searches the log file for matching operations.  Then all the subtrees under the 
node are explored recursively.  After all the subtrees under the root node or any 
intermediate node have been explored, the algorithm marks an edge if it finds evidence 
that shows that all the steps in the attack signature have been executed. 
 The next step in the process is to process the data produced by the log file filtering 
algorithm for candidate sources of the attack [PoR07].  This is accomplished by sorting 
the data by source to produce the list of candidate sources.  The output of the sorting 
process is the identity of the source being investigated.  Therefore, the algorithm should 
be used very carefully as it only provides evidence of activities that were possibly 
involved in an attack.  An investigator may use the identified suspected records with the 
applied corresponding exploit labels to map the evidence back to exploits in the attack 
tree. 
 This research shows how an attack tree can be used to filter and extract attack 
evidence information from a large set of logged data on an attacked system.   
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III. Methodology 
 This chapter presents the methodology used to create the CAMEL, the DCBDA 
process and the steps used for the experimentation of this thesis.  Section 3.1 covers an 
overview to the methodology.  Section 3.2 details the CAMEL and CAMAT creation 
approach.  Section 3.3 covers the DCBDA preparation phase approach.  Section 3.4 
discuses the DCBDA forensic analysis.  Section 3.5 details the experimental design.  
Section 3.6 summarizes the chapter. 
3.1. Methodology Overview 
 The primary goal of this research is to create an analytically rigorous, defensively 
focused cyber battle damage assessment process which utilizes the detailed understanding 
of the attack methodology.  The ability to analyze an attack at any level of progress is 
vital to a network's ability to survive and operate in a hostile environment.  Knowing 
from the studied nature of the sophisticated attacker that a cyber attack is likely to have 
some degree of success, it is crucial for an organization to possess the ability to determine 
if a cyber attack has occurred.   
 The cardinal focus of the proposed DCBDA process is to utilize the intelligent 
comprehensive knowledge of the cyber attack methodology captured in the CAMEL and 
organized in a CAMAT to identify cyber attack forensic markers for an active attack 
incident.  Before the DCBDA process can be used, the CAMEL and CAMAT must be 
created.  Once created, these products are continuously updated with new data by the 
owning organization. 
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 The CAMEL contains the best known set of all collected data concerning the 
actions in cyber attacks.  An overview of the CAMEL creation process and CAMEL data 
relationships are shown in Figure 11.  The data in CAMEL includes attack actions, action 
metrics, attack tools or methods, forensic evidence markers and forensic tools or methods 
associated to the evidence.  Possible sources for CAMEL data are forensic analysis white 
papers, ethical hacker documentation, real world reports, and personal experiences.  The 
CAMAT is the attack tree model built from the comprehensive data in CAMEL.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, an attack tree provides a detailed model in which to gain an 
understanding of the attack methodology that may be used against a target system.   
 
 
Figure 11.  CAMEL and CAMAT Creation Process. 
 
 It is an important goal for this research to create the CAMAT model.  The 
CAMAT allows for detailed modeling of all key actions an attacker takes during an 
attack.  This in turn allows for attack COA study and understanding.  The tailored 
enumeration of attacker actions from the CAMAT pinpoints the exact files, settings, logs 
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and possibly the bits that an attacker modifies during an attack.  By building an 
exhaustive list of attack actions, their related effects and modeling those actions in an 
attack tree, robust damage assessment of a cyber attack is possible. 
 Once the CAMEL and CAMAT exist, the DCBDA process can be utilized for 
assessment.  The DCBDA process in total is depicted in Figure 12.  This figure shows the 
two phases of the DCBDA process.   
 
 
Figure 12.  DCBDA Process. 
 
 The preparation phase begins with attack information derived from an attack 
event.  An example of this attack information could be the knowledge that a malicious 
email attachment was opened.  This information is then applied to the creation of the 
Assessment Attack Tree (AAT) model, which is an event assessment specific attack tree 
built from a subset of the CAMAT.  The AAT is then analyzed and tailored to the attack 
under assessment.  This step creates the Tailored AAT (TAAT).  The event TAAT is then 
analyzed for likely attack scenarios, or COAs, which are ordered and listed in the Attack 
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Scenario List (ASL).  The ASL is then evaluated for evidence markers and associated 
tools or methods to retrieve those markers.  The evidence, tools or methods and the 
actions to which they are associated are listed in the Evidence Marker List (EML).  The 
EML is the final product of the preparation phase of the DCBDA process. 
 The last phase of the DCBDA process is to conduct digital forensic analysis on 
the target system utilizing the EML as a collection guide.  The digital forensic process 
varies by organization, but for the purposes of this research the steps outlined in Section 
2.2.4, collection, examination, analysis and reporting will be used.   
 The forensic analysis starts with the evidence collection action on a target system.  
The collection action uses the preparatory information, the list of software tools or 
methods for evidence gathering, from the previous phase of the DCBDA process.  These 
tools, once executed, will harvest raw data for evidence analysis if found on the target.   
 This evidence analysis will determine if an attack occurred and the details 
surrounding the attack such as damage and enemy COA identification.  These findings 
will answer the key questions of cyber attack.  It is important that the potential damage be 
validated as much as possible from the analysis of the forensic data.  This detailed 
analysis ensures the mission essential technical and operational impact reports, derived 
from DCBDA assessment, are as accurate as possible.   
 The final action in the forensic analysis and the DCBDA process is a report.  The 
report lists, among other things, the collected data from the assessment.  This data will 
include the list of evidence found from collection and the associated attacker action 
which caused the evidence to be generated.  Potential attack vectors, system weaknesses, 
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root causes and incident categories should also be included in this report.  The report will 
detail the findings of the analysis and finalize the DCBDA process.   
3.2. CAMEL and CAMAT Creation Approach 
 This Section covers the creation of the CAMEL and CAMAT as overviewed in 
Section 3.1 and Figure 10.  The CAMEL is the comprehensive knowledge of all known 
cyber attack methodologies comprised of attack actions, attack methods to produce the 
actions, metrics of the attack actions, forensic evidence markers from the actions, and 
forensic tools to retrieve the evidence markers.  CAMAT is the attack tree model of the 
collected data in the CAMEL.  It should be noted that only one CAMEL and CAMAT 
product is needed per organizational implementation.  The steps for CAMEL creation as 
covered in this Section are outlined in Appendix G and listed below.   
1. Collect attack actions 
2. Analyze attack actions for attack methods 
3. Analyze attack actions and methods for forensic evidence 
4. Analyze evidence for forensic tool(s) or method(s) for collection 
5. Analyze metrics for attack actions 
6. Model the CAMEL as CAMAT 
3.2.1. CAMEL Attack Action Data Collection 
 In order to build the CAMEL, data concerning known attacker methodology must 
be gathered, normalized and input into a list.  The primary data point in the CAMEL is 
the collection of attacker actions which comprise the entire cyber attack methodology.  
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The attack action data in CAMEL should include all known COAs and TTPs for all 
known cyber attacks.  The sources for this data should be varied, accurate and as robust 
as possible.  Possible examples include: forensic analysis white papers, ethical hacker 
documentation, real world reports, and personal experiences.  Regardless of the source, 
the overall goal of this aggregation is to detail every cyber attack in its entirety, as part of 
the whole cyber attack methodology, as best as possible and with the most detail. 
 In order for the CAMAT model to be useful for an assessment, the data in which 
it is modeled from must be complete and accurate.  In order to build the CAMEL with 
relevant useful data, the CAMEL Attack Action Data Form shown in Table 15 should be 
used to standardize input collection.  When collecting data for a given action, it is 
important to consider the actions taken before or after the action being analyzed.  These 
actions may have an impact on the data being collected for a given action.   
 
Table 15.  CAMEL Attack Action Data Form. 
 
Field Description Example 
Attack Action This is the identifier given to a specific 
action  
Heap Overflow 
Parent Action(s) These are the parent nodes of this action Gain access to 
web server 
Child Actions(s) These are the children nodes of this action Malformed data  
Attack Vector This is the means which allowed the action 
to exist 
Configuration 
error 
Attack Results/Goal This a description of the actions intended 
results on the target 
User Access 
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 The attack action form will ensure a standardized schema is followed for the 
gathering of necessary information needed for the DCBDA process.  Note that this form 
should be modified to fit a particular organization's requirements for data aggregation.   
3.2.2. CAMEL Attack Method Analysis 
 After the attack actions have been identified, the next set of data to input into the 
CAMEL is the enumeration of the attack methods which produce the attack actions.  This 
data is collected from an analysis of each attack action in CAMEL.  The analysis must 
determine all possible methods which are able to produce the action.  The method data 
discovered from the analysis extends the information in CAMEL about an attack action.  
 Table 16 shows the attack method data collected in the CAMEL which should 
include the name of the attack method, the attack action the method creates, a description 
of what the method achieves and a source to retrieve the method for further research.  
The attack method data allows for a detailed understanding of how the action is created. 
 
Table 16.  CAMEL Attack Method Data. 
 
Field Description Example 
Attack Method This is a known set of the tools or 
procedures that create this action  
User input into web form 
Attack Action This is the attack action the method 
creates 
Command line access to 
web server 
Attack Method 
Description 
This is a description of the attack 
method 
Special characters in web 
form not properly handled 
Attack Method 
Source 
This is a source for the attack method Forensic whitepaper 
59 
 
 When analyzing the scope of the attack action methods of a cyber attacker, the 
analysis should not confine span and definition.  The fact of the matter is when 
considering what methods a cyber attacker can use, there is practically no limit.  Cohen 
states that there is no fundamental distinction between information that can be used as 
data, and information that can be used as program [Coh87].  Essentially data is code and 
code is data.  This consideration must be applied when creating input for the CAMEL. 
3.2.3. CAMEL Evidence Analysis 
 This part of CAMEL creation conducts analysis on the attack methods and actions 
to identify the forensic evidence markers which act as a digital fingerprint of the attack.  
This effort requires a significant amount of research and analysis of the attack data.  The 
attack actions and methods must be thoroughly analyzed and every detail of its effects 
recorded.  The data collection from this analysis must enumerate every trace of evidence 
on a system that can lead to the positive identification of the attack method or action 
occurrence on a system. 
 A measure of confidence analysis must be applied to the identified evidence.  The 
data included in CAMEL from this analysis is shown in Table 17.  Bearing in mind that 
there are no universal processes or scientific underpinnings in the methods used to 
recover or interpret digital information, a level of effort must be applied to give measure 
to the certainty of the forensic analysis action [GiM02].  The confidence analysis can be a 
qualitative value associated to the ability of the evidence marker to properly identify the 
associated attack.  This will allow a DCBDA analyst to measure the relative ability or 
trust placed in the identified evidence for a given attack scenario.     
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Table 17.  CAMEL Evidence Data. 
 
Field Description Example 
Evidence Name Name given to the evidence  Hidden file registry setting 
Attack Action/Method This is the attack action or 
method the evidence identifies 
Folder hidden option 
Forensic Markers These are the details of the 
evidence 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER
\Software\Microsoft\Wind
ows\CurrentVersion\Explo
rer\Advanced 
Evidence Confidence 
(Low, Med, High) 
This is a metric given for the 
confidence of the evidence 
data 
High 
Evidence Source This is a source for further 
information regarding the 
evidence 
Mircosoft.com 
 
3.2.4. CAMEL Forensic Tools and Method Analysis 
 The next step of CAMEL creation is to identify the forensic tool or method to 
retrieve the identified forensic evidence markers.  The specific data to be captured is 
shown in Table 18.  Each evidence marker is evaluated to associate a forensic tool or 
method with the ability to harvest it from a system.  These tools and methods must be 
tested and have the proven ability to retrieve the markers they are correlated with.  A 
measure of confidence and a source must also be included for this analysis.  These 
identified tool and methods will be used in the DCBDA forensic analysis phase to 
determine if an attack has occurred.     
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Table 18.  CAMEL Forensic Tools and Method Data. 
 
Field Description Example 
Forensic Marker These are the details of the 
evidence 
A registry setting 
Forensic Tools/Methods 
for Collection 
This is the tool or method to collect 
the evidence 
Regedit.exe 
Tool/Method Confidence 
(Low, Med, High) 
This is a metric given to the tool or 
method for a confidence value 
High 
Tool/Method Source This is a source for further 
information regarding the tool 
/method 
Microsoft.com 
 
3.2.5. CAMEL Attack Action Metrics Analysis 
 In order for the data in CAMEL to support detailed attack analysis, metrics must 
be assigned to each action.  These metrics allow the attack actions to be compared and 
analyzed for a particular attack being studied.  These metrics can take on any form 
relevant to the organizational entity which uses the CAMEL such as risk, cost and 
impact.  For this thesis research two values will given to each attack action.  These values 
are risk of attack discovery and attack impact.  An organization using CAMEL and 
DCBDA operationally should consider a higher level of emphasis being placed on attack 
metrics such using industry standard guidelines for metric creation and management 
[NIS08].   
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3.2.6. CAMAT Model 
 Once a best known complete set of data for the cyber attack methodology is 
collected, an attack tree modeling the cyber attack data can be created.  This model is 
referred to as the CAMAT, as that it is the graphical representation of the cyber attack in 
its entirety.  The first step in attack tree creation is identifying the top level or root goal.  
This step is the effect the attacker wishes to achieve.  All other actions taken for this root 
goal are considered subordinate and supporting to this goal.  All of the data collected for 
the given root node should be used in creation of the tree to ensure completeness to 
model all aspects of the attack.   
 From the identified root goal, immediate children nodes should be determined.  A 
child node is an action which creates or supports its parent node.  The relationship 
between the child nodes does not have to be binary to ensure completeness, but the union 
of the child nodes must cover every possible type of attack for the vulnerability listed in 
the parent node [Edg07].  This process of identification of new children nodes is now 
completed for the previously identified children of the root goal.  This process is 
continued for all nodes listed until the complete set of aggregated data has been added to 
the tree with the appropriate parent child relationship maintained and modeled.  Each 
node must also be modeled as either a AND, OR or leaf node designation as discussed in 
Section 2.5.1.  Each node must also allow for a reference to the verbose data in CAMEL 
which it was built from.  Below is a pseudo code algorithm which shows how to build an 
attack tree.   
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Algorithm 1 Attack Tree Model Creation Algorithm 
Root Node:  The attack goal  
Parent Node:  A goal which has supporting goals required for fulfillment 
Child Node:  A goal which is subordinate and creates or supports its parent goal  
Build root node 
Set root node as parent 
While a parent has a child 
Build children node(s) of parent 
If a child is a parent 
Set child as a parent 
End While 
 
3.2.7. Assumptions 
 This effort assumes that the evidence evaluation process results in meaningful 
data output which leads to the identification of a marker for collection.  An assumption 
for tool selection must also be noted here.  The manner in which what tools are available 
for use during collection is outside the scope of this research.  Ideally metrics should be 
established that help determine the extent that a software or hardware tool performs a 
particular forensic function, and the associated error rate with that process [GiM02].  
From this tool analysis and selection process a refined tool repository would be available 
for the evidence collection tool selection for the DCBDA process.    
3.3. DCBDA Preparation Phase Approach 
 This approach covers the steps necessary to complete the DCBDA preparatory 
actions as shown in Figure 13.  The preparatory actions of the battle damage assessment 
process are vital to understand the technical impact of a cyber attack.  The purpose of the 
preparation phase is to utilize the intelligent comprehensive knowledge captured in 
64 
 
CAMEL and modeled in CAMAT to determine the forensic evidence and collection 
methods for the forensic analysis.  There are four steps of the DCBDA preparation phase: 
1. AAT Creation 
2. AAT Analysis and TAAT Creation 
3. COA Analysis and ASL Creation 
4. Evidence Evaluation and EML Creation 
 
 
Figure 13.  DCBDA Preparation Phase. 
 The first step in the process is to create the attack tree for the attack event under 
assessment.  This tree is the AAT, which is created from a subset of the CAMAT.  This 
step starts by gathering the relevant information concerning the attack being analyzed.  
This information must include the specific attack actions which are deemed the purposes 
of the cyber attack.  Once the attack actions are known, the CAMEL/CAMAT 
information can be used to create the AAT for the attack being assessed.   
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 The second step analyzes the AAT and tailors the model to the attack being 
assessed.  This is the capability analysis which is completed to prune and prioritize the 
possible actions of the attack under assessment.  This step creates the TAAT.   
 The third step selects and orders likely attack scenarios from the TAAT.  Attack 
scenarios are the collective set of possible COAs followed during the attack.  Once these 
attack scenarios have been listed in an ASL, the evidence of the attack can be identified. 
 The final step of the preparation phase focuses on evidence evaluation based on 
the information in the ASL.  Knowing the enemy's detailed cyber attack COAs enables 
the identification of important evidence markers from the CAMEL to evaluate if a cyber 
attack, or in other words an executed adversary COA, took place on a target system.  The 
identified markers must then be evaluated to associate the trusted forensic software 
programs or methods listed in CAMEL that can retrieve the evidence markers from 
assessment target.  The evidence marker, the action it identifies and the forensic 
collection method(s) comprise the Evidence Marker List (EML) product of this last step 
in the preparation phase of the DCBDA process. 
3.3.1. AAT Creation 
 The first step in the preparation phase of the DCBDA process is to create the 
AAT.  The steps of this process are shown graphically in Figure 14 and are:  
1. Determine the root goal of the attack  
2. Search CAMEL/CAMAT for the root goal 
3. Transfer data of root goal and all subordinate children actions from 
CAMEL/CAMAT to create the AAT 
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Figure 14.  DCBDA AAT Creation. 
 The first step of AAT creation is to determine the root goal of the attack from the 
gathered relevant information concerning the attack event being analyzed and assessed.  
This information must include the specific attack action which is deemed the purpose of 
the cyber attack.  This is the root goal for the assessment.  Once the root attack action is 
known, the information in the CAMEL/CAMAT can be used to create the AAT. 
 The next step searches the CAMEL/CAMAT for the root goal identified in the 
previous step.  If the goal is not specifically found, the assessment must decide the most 
reasonable parent goal that is of the same category of the attack.  An example of this 
would be an unknown method for gaining access to a computer.  The root goal for this 
example would be gaining access.   
 The final step of AAT creation creates the AAT from the data in the 
CAMEL/CAMAT.  When the root goal is found in CAMEL/CAMAT the data is copied 
and transferred starting with the root goal, to include all children and their associated 
children.  This data retains the parent child relationships, thus remains an attack tree.  
This data is now the AAT and can be used for attack analysis. 
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3.3.2. AAT Analysis and TAAT Creation 
 Once the AAT has been created, it is time to apply a level of analysis on the 
segment of data which has been aggregated and modeled for the DCBDA.  This analysis 
process is depicted in Figure 15.  While the goal of the CAMEL is to be as complete as 
possible, the end goal for the AAT analysis is to prune the total set of attacker COAs to a 
manageable, applicable and believable set.  This will be captured in the TAAT.  It is an 
intuitive approach to this analysis that realizes an attacker is much less likely to try every 
single attack method, rather than just a few of the most probable or applicable.  The two 
parts to this step of the preparation phase of DCBDA are: 
1. Capability Determination 
2. Capability Analysis 
 The first step in AAT analysis is to apply capability determination to the attack 
actions represented by the values of the associated metrics.  This analysis uses the 
collected attack event information to update and/or apply new metrics to the attack 
actions in the AAT.  Essentially this step creates an assessment AAT which contains 
updated data to reflect the particular attack being assessed.  The same level of rigor used 
to create the metrics for CAMEL should be applied here.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
the metrics will not be updated or modified.  Once the capability determination is 
complete, capability analysis can be accomplished.   
 Capability analysis, the second part of this step, determines which actions should 
not be considered for inclusion in the DCBDA TAAT.  This analysis uses the attack 
action metrics to determine if an attack action should be removed from the AAT and the 
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attack assessment.  This determination can be decided from a known attacker capability, 
attack event data or an arbitrary decision by the DCBDA analyst.  This analysis process is 
known as pruning, as the resulting attack tree will be smaller than the original.  It should 
be noted that the pruning process can remove plausible potential attack vectors from the 
attack tree.  The product of this step will be a TAAT which is an attack tree with the 
realizable set of attack scenarios for the given attack event being assessed. 
 
 
Figure 15.  DCBDA AAT Analysis and TAAT Creation. 
 
3.3.3. COA Analysis and ASL Creation 
 This step of the preparatory actions for DCBDA is COA analysis and ASL 
creation.  This step is outlined in Figure 16.  Recall from Section 2.5.2.1 that an attack 
scenario is a particular path through an attack tree that leads from a minimal set of one or 
more leaf nodes to the root.  At this point the TAAT will have numerous possible attacks 
to achieve the root goal.  In order to maximize the efficiency and accuracy of the damage 
assessment, attack scenarios should be identified, listed and ordered according from the 
most to the least likely.  This list is referred to as the ASL.  This intelligence product 
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provides a decision maker with a threat assessment based on an analysis of the full range 
of adversary capabilities and a prediction of the adversary’s likely intention [DOD07].  
The ASL is based on the given collected attack data which has been modeled into 
information, analyzed by capability and coalesced into a tailored attack tree model. 
 
 
Figure 16.  DCBDA Attack Scenario Analysis and ASL Creation. 
 
 The priority of attack scenarios can be decided from the combined results of the 
TAAT capability analysis or an arbitrary determination from the DCBDA analyst.  
Depending on the size of the attack tree being analyzed it is very useful for time 
considerations of an assessment to develop a prioritized list of attack scenarios.  This 
allows the DCBDA forensic analysis to place the analysis of probable attack scenarios 
ahead of unlikely attack scenarios.  This ordering will also enable a threshold decision to 
be made when considering what forensic evidence collection tools to use on the target 
system.  An example format for this listing is shown in Table 19.  The ASL is the product 
of this stage of the DCBDA process.   
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Table 19.  DCBDA ASL. 
 
Attack Scenario Data 
Scenario Name  
Attack Action Listing  
 
3.3.4. Evidence Evaluation and EML Creation 
 The final step in the preparation phase of the DCBDA process is evidence 
evaluation and EML creation.  The actions of this step are outlined in Figure 17.  The 
goal of evidence evaluation is to use the listed attack scenarios in the ASL to identify the 
forensic evidence markers and the forensic tools necessary to determine if the actions 
took place on a system.  This process takes the relevant data in the CAMEL and transfers 
it into the EML.   
 
 
Figure 17.  DCBDA Evidence Evaluation and EML Creation. 
 
71 
 
 The EML is the specific evidence and tools needed to identify the attack being 
assessed.  The evaluation of the evidence should take into account the operating 
environment of the analysis in determining the appropriate tools to identify.  The EML is 
the product of the evidence evaluation and is the final product of the preparation phase of 
the DCBDA process.  The EML is next used for the forensic analysis process. 
 Table 20 holds the format which is used as a record in the EML product.  In total 
the EML is comprised of a record, or entry, for each action in the attack scenario which 
has information regarding the name of the action, the evidence identifiers which identify 
the action, and the associated tool which retrieves the identifiers. 
 
Table 20.  DCBDA EML Data. 
 
Field Description Example 
Evidence Name This is the name given to 
the evidence 
Hidden file registry setting 
Name of Action This is the identifier given 
to a specific action  
Heap Overflow 
Forensic Marker These are the details of the 
evidence 
A registry setting 
Forensic Tools/Method This is the tool or method 
to collect the evidence 
Regedit.exe 
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3.3.5. Assumptions 
 The exact makeup of the AAT will change depending on many factors.  The 
target system can have a large impact on the makeup of the attack tree.  A particular OS 
may have a very different attack vector than an OS version with only a service pack in 
difference.  For the purposes of this research, the focus will remain on one target system.  
This will allow the data in the DCBDA process to be demonstrated, and therefore have 
the ability to be expanded or created new for different targets. 
3.4. DCBDA Forensic Analysis Approach 
 This phase of the DCBDA research effort is the collection, analysis and reporting 
for the forensic analysis.  A graphical representation of this phase is shown in Figure 18.  
This phase acts on the culmination of data aggregation, modeling, evaluation and analysis 
of the DCBDA preparation phase.  This step also takes the DBCDA process from the 
intelligence preparation process into active defense assessment.  The goal of DCBDA 
forensic analysis is the recovering, analyzing and presenting of evidence of a potential 
attack on a target system.  This research will follow the analysis guidelines found in 
Section 2.2.4 which is further detailed in the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response [NIS06].   
 
 
Figure 18.  DCBDA Forensic Analysis. 
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3.4.1. Evidence Collection 
 This step of the DCBDA is the execution of the tools identified in the EML.  The 
listed tools, or forensic COAs, will collect the evidence needed for the attack analysis.  It 
is important that a standardized process be followed when running these tools.  The exact 
process of collection will vary according to organizational procedures, tools, environment 
and many other factors.  There are many examples of guidelines which may be used for 
the collection of evidence during a forensic analysis [DOJ04] [NIS06].     
3.4.2. Evidence Analysis 
 With the identified evidence for the attack collected, it is time to begin analysis of 
the attack.  This process is the investigation into the meaning of what evidence was found 
on the target system.  Recall from Section 2.2.4.3 that the objective of analysis is to 
derive useful information which forms conclusions to the questions that were the impetus 
for performing the collection and examination [NIS06].  There are several methods of 
analysis that may be conducted depending on the type of attack and the data collected.  
Some examples of analysis that may be performed include timeframe, data hiding, 
application and file, and ownership and possession [DoJ04]. 
 The collected data must be processed into usable information.  This process 
examines the set of data collected from the target system and locates the evidence within.  
Essentially the examination gleans the pertinent useful data from the total set of 
information harvested from the forensic tools.  This data is then analyzed to determine if 
an attack occurred and the details surrounding the attack such as damage, cause and 
enemy COA identification.   
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 The analysis of the data should break down the findings from collection and 
deduce their meaning.  The analysis should compare the collected evidence information 
to the EML to determine if the attack actions identified in the DCBDA preparation phase 
occurred.     
3.4.3. Reporting 
 The report is the final product of the DCBDA process, and is the detailed 
chronicle of the damage assessment based on the evidence analysis.  The purpose of this 
report is to document the determination if an attack, or weapon system, was used against 
the target.  An analyst or examiner has the responsibility for completely and accurately 
reporting the findings and results of an analysis of the digital evidence examination 
[DoJ04].  This step relies on the presence of proper documentation at each step of the 
DCBDA process.  Notes, copies, times, documents and any pertinent additional 
information must be kept throughout the assessment. 
 The report lists the collected data from the assessment.  This data will include the 
list of evidence found from collection and the associated attacker action which caused the 
evidence to be generated.  Potential attack vectors, system weaknesses, root causes and 
incident categories should also be included in this report.  The report will detail the 
findings of the analysis and finalize the DCBDA process. 
3.4.4. Assumptions 
 This research does not address a specific organizations forensic analysis 
capabilities or ability to comprehend, act or report on the data collected from the DCBDA 
process.  The actions in this methodology are used as research and meant to be tailored to 
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an operational level.  For the purposes of this research it is assumed that the tools used 
and run during collection are done so in a forensically-sound manner. 
3.5. Experimental Method to Verify the DCBDA Process  
 The objective of the experiment outlined in this Section is to verify the DCBDA 
process by conducting assessments as outlined in the methodology in Sections 3.3 and 
3.4.  The experiment will create a CAMEL/CAMAT, and then conduct different 
DCBDAs on target test systems.  The EML created during the preparation phases will 
then be compared to the gathered evidence to determine the success of the DCBDA.  The 
test systems for use in this experiment will represent computer systems which are the 
victims of successful cyber attacks.  Appendix H details the steps taken to setup the test 
systems.  The experiment is divided into three tests each designed to test an attack 
scenario produced from the DCBDA preparation phase. 
3.5.1. Experiment Scope 
 The attack used for this experimentation will focus on the Covering Tracks attack 
action of the cyber attacker methodology [SkL05].  This decision places a margin on the 
experiment, as that any attack tactic, technique, procedure and target could be used as a 
basis for an attack tree model and subsequent steps of the DCBDA process.  Focusing on 
one attack allows for a threshold to be placed on the amount of data included for a viable 
proof of concept of the modeled attack tree, the forensic marker enumeration, analysis 
and subsequent actions in other areas in this research. 
76 
 
 The target OS used for this attack is Windows XP.  The attacker capabilities do 
not include any attack action or method which is evaluated to be of high risk of 
discovery.  Also, any action which is outside the scope of the target OS is not be 
considered. 
3.5.2. System Boundaries 
 The System Under Test (SUT) is the DCBDA process.  Figure 19 shows the SUT.  
It consists of the AAT (TAAT), the ASL, the EML and Forensic Analysis components.  
The Component Under Test (CUT) is the data contained in the EML of the DCBDA.  
The CUT is designed and optimized for each test to compare system output to the 
workload parameter.  The workload parameter of the system is an attack scenario 
environment, such as a victim computer system.  The system parameters are the CAMEL 
and CAMAT.  The system response metric is the gathered evidence, in a DCBDA report, 
which documents the damage and evidence of the cyber attack event.   
 
Figure 19.  DCBDA SUT Diagram. 
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3.5.3. Experimental Design  
 The objective of the experiment is to determine if the DCBDA process is able to 
conduct a conclusive cyber attack damage assessment.  This is done by comparing the 
EML of the test to the evidence gathered from conducting a DCBDA on the test victim 
computer.   
 The first step of the experiment is to create a CAMEL and CAMAT from the 
methodology steps outlined in Section 3.2.  These products are used for all of the tests 
without modification.   
 The next step of the experiment is to conduct the preparation phase of the 
DCBDA process as outline in Section 3.3.  This step of the experiment will use the 
CAMEL and CAMAT created in the previous step and the attack scenarios outlined in 
Table 21 as attack event input.  This step of the experiment must create an ASL for each 
of the three attack scenarios.  These three ASLs will be used to produce three respective 
EMLs, one for each forensic analysis experiment tests.   
 
Table 21.  Experiment Test Scenarios. 
 
Attack 
Scenario 
Initial Analysis Attack 
Action 
Damage suspected 
1 Covering Tracks 
maneuver has occurred 
A suspected ICMP covert channel is disguised 
by a rootkit.  Possible log manipulation 
suspected as well. 
2 Covering Tracks 
maneuver has occurred 
Possible auditing manipulation.  Alternate data 
stream possible to cover attack executables.  
Files denoting recent activity may have been 
cleaned off of system as well. 
3 Covering Tracks 
maneuver has occurred 
Suspicious files on the target system 
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 The final step of the experiment is to conduct the forensic analysis phase of the 
DCBDA process.  The inputs for this part of the experiment are the three EMLs created 
in the previous step.  These experiment tests will produce reports which will be compared 
to the EMLs to determine the results of the experiment as a whole.  The forensic analysis 
experiment tests for this step are described below. 
3.5.3.1. Test 1 
 This test uses the system Test_1 described in Table 22.  The DCBDA input is 
attack scenario 1 in Table 21.  The DCBDA forensic analysis phase will be completed as 
outlined in Section 3.4 using EML 1 produced in the DCBDA preparation phase 
following the previous step of the experiment.    
 
Table 22.  Experiment Test_1 System. 
 
VM Name Test_1 
VM Configuration 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Quad CPU using 2 cores, 1GB RAM, 
3GB hard drive, bridged Ethernet adapter 
Guest OS Windows XP Service Pack 3 
Specific Attacker 
Actions/Files 
(1) WinPCap 4.1.2 installed.   
(2) ptunnel.exe used to create an ICMP tunnel to a receiving 
proxy previously setup.   
(3) The FU rootkit used to hide the ptunnel.exe process.   
(4) Evidence Eliminator used to clear the event logs of any 
trace of these actions. 
 
3.5.3.2. Test 2 
 This test uses the system Test_2 described in Table 23.  The DCBDA input is 
attack scenario 2 in Table 21.  The DCBDA forensic analysis phase will be completed as 
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outlined in Section 3.4 using EML 2 produced in the DCBDA preparation phase 
following the previous step of the experiment. 
 
Table 23.  Experiment Test_2 System. 
 
VM Name Test_2 
VM Configuration 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Quad CPU using 2 cores, 1GB RAM, 
3GB hard drive, bridged Ethernet adapter 
Guest OS Windows XP Service Pack 3 
Specific Attacker 
Actions/Files 
(1) Disable EventLogs service in Administrator tool: Services.   
(2) Two Alternate Data Streams (ADS) created using the type 
cmd to hide notional attack executable bad.exe in calc.exe.   
(3) Two txt files created, deleted and 'emptied' from Recycle 
Bin.   
(4) ZeroTracks used to remove browsing and recent file 
history.   
 
3.5.3.3. Test 3 
 This test uses the system Test_3 described in Table 24.  The DCBDA input is 
attack scenario 3 in Table 21.  The DCBDA forensic analysis phase will be completed as 
outlined in Section 3.4 using EML 3 produced in the DCBDA preparation phase 
following the previous step of the experiment 
 
Table 24.  Experiment Test_3 System. 
 
VM Name Test_3 
VM Configuration 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Quad CPU using 2 cores, 1GB RAM, 
3GB hard drive, bridged Ethernet adapter 
Guest OS Windows XP Service Pack 3 
Specific Attacker 
Actions/Files 
(1) Create secrets.txt file. 
(2) Use steghide-0.5.1-win32 to hide secrets.txt into 
winter.jpg.   
(3) Use timestomp.exe to modify time value of winter.jpg to 
Monday 1/1/2001 01:01:01 AM. 
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3.5.4. Test Systems Specifications  
 Each test machine, which is a clean system before attacker actions, is a virtual 
machine instance of Windows XP, Service Pack 3, running on top of a 64-bit Microsoft 
Windows 7 Enterprise host operating system.  VMWare Workstation 7.1.8 build 324285 
provides the virtualization support.   
 Using virtual test systems as defined in Tables 22, 23 and 24 allows the attack 
actions to run on the clean system, and then the system state can be reverted for the next 
attack test.  This also provides the capability to create an image of the machine's state at 
any time during the tests.  This allows for restoration of the machine's state the clean 
baseline or test state for evidence collections. 
3.6. Methodology Summary 
 In this chapter the methodology to complete the research is outlined.  The 
approach to create the CAMEL is discussed to include how to gather and model 
information for the CAMAT.  The DCBDA process is outlined.  The basic steps to 
analyze the attack data and the selection of attack scenarios are discussed.  The evidence 
evaluation process of DCBDA is covered to include the Evidence Marker List.  The 
basics of the forensic collection, analysis and reporting are also outlined.  The Section 
concluded by covering the experimental design.   
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IV. Experimentation and Results 
 The purpose of this chapter is to document the experimentation and results from 
applying and testing the DCBDA process as documented in Chapter 3.  The focus of this 
chapter is to create a CAMEL and CAMAT, perform the DCBDA preparation phase 
actions, and conduct the DCBDA forensic analysis tests.  The conducted DCBDA 
forensic analysis will use the EMLs from the preparation phase to actively conduct 
assessment experiments on target test systems to determine the validity and success of the 
DCBDA process.  The emphasis, while conducting these actions, focuses on analyzing 
the results and documenting relevant findings. 
 Section 4.1 covers the creation of the CAMEL and CAMAT.  Section 4.2 covers 
the completion of the DCBDA preparation phase.  Section 4.3 reports the conducting and 
results of the forensic analysis experiments.  Section 4.4 is an overall representation of 
the experiment results.  Section 4.5 presents a summary of the chapter. 
4.1. Create the CAMEL and CAMAT 
 The data in the CAMEL is essential to the DCBDA process.  For this experiment, 
a CAMEL is constructed and used to prepare for the active collection during the forensic 
analysis experimentation.  The results from following the CAMEL and CAMAT creation 
methodology for this experiment are outlined in the following Section.   
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4.1.1. CAMEL Attack Action Data Collection 
 The objective to this step of building the CAMEL is to collect data regarding the 
cyber attack methodology in its entirety.  To gather information concerning this attack, 
CAMEL Attack Action Data Forms are filled out and the data is coalesced into a 
spreadsheet as shown in Appendix B.  A variety of sources are used for the attack action 
information gathering [Bos02] [DBM09] [MSK05] [SkL05].  The attack vector 
information included uses Appendix A as the format for the data.  A subset of the 
gathered data is shown in Table 25.    
 
Table 25.  CAMEL Attack Action Data Subset. 
Attack Action
Parent 
Action(s)
Child 
Action(s)
Attack 
Vector Attack Results/Goal
ICMP Covert 
Channel
Covert 
Channel None 4a,4b This action installs an ICMP covert channel
HTTP Covert 
Channel
Covert 
Channel None 4a,4b This action installs a HTTP covert channel
DNS Covert 
Channel
Covert 
Channel None 4a,4b This action installs a DNS covert channel
TCP Covert 
Tunnel
Covert 
Channel None 4a,4b This action installs a TCP covert channel  
 
 A threshold is placed on the amount of data collected for the CAMEL used in this 
experiment.  The data gathered concerning the cyber attack methodology represents a 
possible best effort comprehensive collection with the attention for greater detail placed 
on the Covering Tracks attack actions. The data collected facilitates the needs for the 
remaining steps of this experiment.     
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4.1.2. CAMEL Attack Method Analysis 
 With the attack actions input into CAMEL, the actions are now analyzed to link 
and associate appropriate attack methods capable of creating the actions.  For this 
experiment, this data is discovered through a variety of sources which are included in the 
spreadsheet located in Appendix C.  This spreadsheet contains the results of the CAMEL 
attack method analysis and extends the data listed in the previous step.  The data is 
considered to be a representation of a possible best effort analysis of the attack actions.  
Particular effort is placed on analyzing the Covering Tracks attack actions.  Table 26 
shows a subset of the attack method data.   
 
Table 26.  CAMEL Attack Method Data Subset. 
Attack Method Attack Action Attack Method Description Source
cmd: cp Alternate Data Stream Command line type
http://www.windowsecurity.com/articl
es/Alternate_Data_Streams.html
AFX Windows 
RootKit Application Rootkit System patch to hide information
http://www.megasecurity.org/trojans/a
/aphex/Afx_win_rootkit2003.html
Evidence Eliminator Delete Attack Files
Erase temp files, histories, recent 
documents http://www.evidence-eliminator.com/
Tracks Eraser Pro Delete Attack Files
Erase temp files, histories, recent 
documents http://www.acesoft.net/
Netcat Backdoor
Backdoor remote access 
program
http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/1
39
ZeroTracks Delete browsing history
Erase temp files, histories, recent 
documents http://zerotracks.en.softonic.com/  
 
4.1.3. CAMEL Evidence Analysis 
 The CAMEL evidence analysis process conducts an analysis on the attack 
methods and actions to identify the forensic evidence markers which act as a digital 
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fingerprint of the attack.  For this experiment, this data is discovered through a variety of 
sources which are included in the spreadsheet located in Appendix D.  The evidence 
confidence evaluation values are decided through consideration of the evidence source 
and are based on a cursory analysis of the markers ability to identify the associated attack 
method or action.  The metrics used are low, medium or high confidence factor.  Table 27 
shows a subset of the data in Appendix D. 
 
Table 27.  CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data Subset. 
Evidence 
Name
Attack 
Action/Method Forensic Marker
Forensic 
Tools
Evidence 
Confidence Evidence Source
Failed login 
attempt Brutus
Failed login attempts 
in log PyFlag H
http://www.webhostgear.com/
240.html
Proxy attack WebScarab Malformed data Wireshark H
http://www.owasp.org/index.p
hp/Category:OWASP_WebS
carab_Project
suspicious 
open ports Netcat suspicious open ports netstat H
http://technet.microsoft.com/e
n-us/library/bb490947.aspx
Trojan actitivy Beast
Suspicious Trojan 
activity Regedit.exe H
http://www.exterminate-
it.com/malpedia/remove-
beast#howfiles
System folder 
missing
cmd: del 
windows\prefetch 
windows\prefetch 
missing cmd H None
Hidden folders Hide Folders 2009 Hidden folders cmd L
http://www.fspro.net/hide-
folders/
 
 The spreadsheet in Appendix D contains the results of the CAMEL evidence 
analysis.  This product extends the CAMEL created in the previous steps.  The data 
values assigned for the evidence analysis portion of the experiment are considered to be a 
representation of a possible best effort analysis of the attack methods.  Particular effort is 
placed on analyzing the Covering Tracks attack methods.   
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4.1.4. CAMEL Forensic Tool and Method Analysis 
 This step of the CAMEL creation process identifies the forensic method or tool 
which has the ability to retrieve the identified forensic evidence markers.  Each unique 
forensic marker is analyzed for a forensic retrieval method.  These identified tools are 
essential to the forensic analysis process and due consideration should be given to 
analyzing the correct tool to retrieve the attack evidence.   
 The spreadsheet in Appendix E contains the results of the CAMEL tool and 
method analysis for this experiment.  This product further extends the CAMEL created in 
the previous steps.  The data values assigned for the tool and method analysis portion of 
the experiment are considered to be a representation of a possible best effort analysis and 
evaluation.  Particular effort is placed on analyzing the Covering Tracks evidence 
markers.  Table 28 shows a subset of the data captured for the method and tool analysis. 
 
Table 28.  CAMEL Forensic Tool and Method Data Subset. 
Forensic Marker
Forensic 
Tool/Method
Tool 
Confidence Tool/Method Source
Streams will examine the 
files and directories for 
streams Streams M
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897440.aspx
Searches drives & lists all 
files that have ADS ADSTools M
http://www.soft32.com/download_20753
5.html
System search for all active 
ADS ADS Scanner M
http://www.pointstone.com/products/AD
S-Scanner/
 list, view or delete 
Alternate Data Streams 
(ADS) ADS Spy M
http://www.brothersoft.com/ads-spy-
74079.html
Suspected Rootkit activity RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
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4.1.5. CAMEL Attack Action Metrics Analysis 
 This step of the CAMEL creation process analyzes the combined aggregation of 
the data in the CAMEL to assign capability metrics to each attack action.  These metrics 
must be based off of all data associated to the action.  This is namely the attack method, 
evidence and tool/method for retrieval.   
 For this experiment two metrics are assigned to each attack action.  Risk of attack 
discovery is a low, medium or high value given to the action which is a value given for 
the likelihood the attack action is discovered in a typical target computer system.  The 
values assigned are based on a computer system being passively monitored for 
unauthorized activities by some means.  The second value is an impact of attack 
measured as low, medium or high value given to the action which is a value of what 
impact the action has on a target system.  Each of the attack actions are analyzed and 
assigned a value for these factors.  Table 29 contains a subset of the data collected for this 
analysis. 
  
Table 29.  CAMEL Capability Metrics Data Subset. 
Attack Action Parent Action(s)
Child 
Action(s)
Risk of 
Discovery Impact
ICMP Covert Channel Covert Channel None M H
HTTP Covert Channel Covert Channel None H H
DNS Covert Channel Covert Channel None L H
TCP Covert Tunnel Covert Channel None H L  
 
The spreadsheet in Appendix F contains the results of the CAMEL attack action metrics 
analysis.  This product extends the CAMEL created in the previous steps.  The data 
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values assigned for the attack action metrics analysis portion of the experiment are 
considered to be a representation of a possible best effort analysis and evaluation.  
Particular effort is placed on analyzing the Covering Tracks metrics. 
4.1.6. CAMAT Model 
 The experimental data collection and analysis for CAMEL is complete.  Now the 
data is modeled as an attack tree.  The root goal used for CAMAT is Cyber Attack.  The 
tree building process outlined in Section 3.2.6 is followed to build the CAMAT.  The 
completed model is shown in Figure 20, with the majority of the Covering Tracks portion 
of the attack tree not shown.  That attack area will be covered in greater detail during the 
DCBDA process of the experiment.   
 
 
Figure 20.  An Example of a CAMAT. 
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4.1.7. CAMEL Findings and Results 
 The research and creation of the CAMEL and CAMAT following the 
methodology outlined in Chapter 3 led to important findings.  These findings can be used 
to further refine this research, be considered for operational CAMEL usage, or help guide 
future work efforts.  The overall result is the creation of the CAMEL and CAMAT for 
use in the DCBDA experimentation. 
4.1.7.1. Attack Action Data 
 Overall, the information included in CAMEL must be tailored to fit an 
organization's operational requirements for DCBDA.  The adaptation of the CAMEL 
process in this research must be thoroughly managed and documented starting with the 
CAMEL Attack Action Data Form.  This form is the basis for all other CAMEL data 
collection and analysis.  The data and format for this initial population of information 
into the CAMEL must be given due consideration in an operational implementation to 
ensure the success of dependent cyber battle damage assessments.   
4.1.7.2. Evidence Marker Analysis 
 During this research implementation of CAMEL it is important to ensure 
evidence markers are as detailed and accurate as possible.  These markers are the pivotal 
data of the CAMEL.  The forensic tool must be properly identified from the evidence 
marker analysis and also have the ability to properly find the correct data to assess 
damage from a cyber attack.  This can only happen through the detailed analysis of attack 
evidence markers. 
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4.1.7.3. Sensitive Data 
 The detailed collection and analysis of an adversaries attack methodology actions 
should be considered sensitive information.  An operational implementation of the 
CAMEL and CAMAT should consider this sensitivity of the data aggregation.  This 
product could also have the potential to be used against an organization if the attacker 
gained knowledge of their understanding of the cyber attack.   
4.2. DCBDA Preparation 
 In this Section the preparatory phase actions of the DCBDA is completed.  This is 
done by collecting attack event information, building the AAT from the 
CAMEL/CAMAT, identifying likely attack COAs through capability analysis, and 
evaluating the relevant evidence to create the EML for forensic analysis consideration.   
4.2.1. AAT Creation 
 The root goal attack being used for this experiment is the Covering Tracks phase 
of the hacker methodology which seeks to obfuscate any actions taken during the rest of 
the attack [SkL05].  This is the root goal for the AAT used for the DCBDA in this 
experiment.  To build the AAT the Covering Tracks attack action is found in the CAMEL 
and the CAMAT.  All data concerning the Covering Tracks attack action and the 
subordinate children are taken from the CAMAT and used to build the AAT.   
 The AAT of the Covering Tracks attack action is shown in Figure 21.  The AAT 
has 26 leaf nodes identified and 4 main children; log obfuscation, persistent access 
obfuscation, attack data obfuscation and covert channel.  Now that the AAT is created 
90 
 
using the data in CAMAT and CAMEL, the attack methodology capability analysis of the 
attack tree metrics is applied.   
4.2.2. AAT Analysis and TAAT Creation 
 The key step of this action in the DCBDA process is to apply an analysis to the 
data which has been retrieved from the CAMEL and modeled in the AAT.  This is done 
through capability determination and analysis.  For this experiment, the metrics in the 
AAT built from the CAMEL are not altered as part of the capability determination 
process.   
 The capability analysis used for the TAAT follows the experimental scope of the 
attacker capabilities.  For this experiment, any action which had a high risk of discovery 
is removed from the attack tree.  Once the metric analysis is complete a pruning, or 
removal or irrelevant actions, of the attack tree is accomplished.   
 The pruned AAT, now called the TAAT, is then modeled with only the nodes 
deemed the focus of this DCBDA.  The Covering Tracks TAAT model is shown in 
Figure 22.  The TAAT, along with the associated data for each action from CAMEL, will 
be the input for the next part of the experiment, the DCBDA COA analysis.   
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Figure 21.  Covering Tracks AAT. 
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Figure 22.  Covering Tracks TAAT. 
 
4.2.3. COA Analysis and ASL Creation 
 Using the knowledge of the attack from the AAT analysis, the goal of this step is 
to understand and produce tailored attack COA intelligence, namely the listing of 
prioritized attack scenarios tailored to the attack being assessed.  This list is captured in 
the ASL.  The attack scenarios are created as a listing of attack actions an attacker would 
use during an attack.   
 Table 30 shows the ASL which has the three attack scenarios created for this 
experiment.  These attack scenarios represent three plausible situations for this 
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experiment following the experimental scope.  The shaded cells represent leaf nodes.  
Attack Scenario 1 is a covert channel being the first step taken by the attacker.  Attack 
Scenario 2 focuses on auditing disablement as a priority.  Finally, attack scenario 3 
focuses on steganography use. 
 
Table 30.  DCBDA Experiment ASL. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Covering Tracks Covering Tracks Covering Tracks
Covert Channel Log Obfuscation Hide Attack Data
ICMP Covert Channel Disable Auditing Steganography
Persistent Access Obfuscation Hide Attack Data Hide Attack Data
Rootkit Alternate Data Stream Time Stamp Alteration
Kernel Rootkit Delete Attack Files
Log Obfuscation Delete Prefetch
Erase Logs Delete Browsing History
Delete "Recent" History
 
4.2.4. Evidence Evaluation and EML Creation 
 The goal of evidence evaluation in the DCBDA process is to use the listed attack 
scenarios in the ASL to identify the forensic evidence markers and the forensic tools from 
the CAMEL necessary to determine if the actions took place on a system.  This data is 
input into the EML which is the product of the evaluation and used by the DCBDA 
forensic analysis to determine if the attack scenario occurred. The three EMLs created 
from this data are shown in Tables 31, 32 and 33.  
 
  
94 
 
Table 31.  EML for ASL: Scenario 1. 
Evidence Name Attack Action/Method Forensic Marker Forensic Tool
ptunnel ptunnel ptunnel.exe on system cmd, search
ICMP traffic volume ICMP Covert Channel Suspicious ICMP traffic Wireshark
WinPCap for ptunnel ptunnel WinPCap installed cmd, search
Kernel Rootkit Rootkit Suspected Rootkit Activity
RootkitRevealer, 
FSecure Blacklight
Missing/Incomplete logs ClearLogs Missing/incomplete logs Event Viewer
 
Table 32.  EML for ASL Scenario 2. 
Evidence Name Attack Action/Method Forensic Marker Forensic Tool
Missing/incomplete logs Disable Auditing Missing/incomplete logs Event Viewer
Disable EventLog service Disable Auditing Disable EventLog service Services
ADS detection Alternate Data Stream System search for all active ADS ADS Scanner
Files removed ZeroTracks Files removed File Scavenger  
 
Table 33.  EML for ASL Scenario 3. 
Evidence Name Attack Action/Method Forensic Marker Forensic Tool
Suspicious files/sizes Steganography Suspicious files/sizes Stegdetect
Suspicious files/sizes Steganography Suspicious files/sizes StegSpy
Suspicious time stamp values Timestomp Suspicious MACE values dir c:\ /A /S /T:W  
 
4.2.5. DCBDA Preparation Findings and Results 
 The results of this stage of the experiment are the three EMLs which contain the 
evidence markers and tools necessary to identify the attack under assessment in the 
experiment tests.  The results achieved from executing the cyber attack methodology in 
Chapter 3 match the expectations of the thesis, which is the completion of the preparation 
phase of the DCBDA.  The process relies heavily on the work completed for the 
CAMEL.  Notable findings during the conduct of the experiment are listed here.  
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4.2.5.1. Capability analysis is crucial to proper assessment 
 The metrics given to an attack node should be chosen and assigned with proper 
consideration.  These metrics are the basis for tree pruning and subsequent attack 
scenario selection.  Improper values for these metrics can lead to incorrect pruning of 
possible attack actions and therefore the damage assessment will be hindered. 
4.2.5.2. EML data 
 The data in the EML should be as relevant as needed for the organization 
performing the forensic analysis.  This EML format should be modified to include any 
additional information needed from the DCBDA preparation phase. 
4.3. Experiment to Verify the DCBDA Process  
 This portion of the experiment conducts the DCBDA forensic analysis process on 
the test systems described in Section 3.5.3 using the methodology outlined in Section 3.4  
The goal of this portion of the experiment is to test the CUT, the three EMLs created in 
Section 4.2.4, to the results of the these tests.  The objective is to determine if a Covering 
Tracks maneuver took place on the target test systems and to also deduce the specific 
attacker actions discovered. 
4.3.1. Test 1 Collection and Analysis 
 The tools identified in the EML for Scenario 1 in Table 31 are run on the system 
Test_1 as described in Table 22.  The results are listed below.   
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 The first method for action is searching for the ICMP covert channel program, 
ptunnel.  The resulting search found existence of files associated with the tool.  The 
results are shown in Figure 23.  The existence of ptunnel in the \Prefetch folder indicates 
that the program has been executed on Test_1.     
 
 
Figure 23.  Search Results for ptunnel on Test_1. 
 
 The second method in the EML is to use the tool Wireshark tool to identify 
suspicious ICMP traffic.  The tool is installed and used on Test_1.  The results in Figure 
24 show the tool is able to identify suspicious ICMP traffic.  The ICMP traffic to an 
unknown address indicates Test_1 is using a covert channel to communicate undetected. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Results for Wireshark Execution on Test_1. 
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 The third method identified in the EML is to search for WinPCap installed on the 
target.  The basic search found existence of files associated with the WinPCap program.  
The results are shown in Figure 25.  This is another indication that a covert channel 
exists.     
 
 
Figure 25.  Search Results for WinPCap on Test_1. 
 
 The fourth method in the EML for test 1 is to use RootkitRevealer and F-Secure 
Blacklight to search for a suspected Rootkit.  F-Secure Blacklight found the ptunnel.exe 
process which is hidden.  The process identified by Blacklight is shown in Figure 26.   
 Figure 27 shows the results from running RootkitRevealer on the target system.  
RootkitRevealer is able to identify two suspect registry keys.  Overall the results for this 
step in the EML are a success, due to Backlight's identification of the hidden covert 
tunnel process.      
 The final method in the EML is to use Event Viewer to discover any missing or 
incomplete logs.  Figure 28 shows the success of finding the Security log empty.  This 
log being modified is a positive indication of Covering Tracks evidence. 
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Figure 26.  F-Secure BlackLight Results for Rootkit Detection on Test_1. 
 
 
Figure 27.  RootkitRevealer Results on Test_1. 
 
 
Figure 28.  Event Viewer Results on Test_1. 
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4.3.2. Test 1 Report and Results  
 This Section is the forensic analysis report for the first test and is the final product 
of this DCBDA process.  The determination of the assessment is a successful cyber attack 
is executed against the target.  The ptunnel and FU Rootkit weapons were used in a 
Covering Tracks maneuver.   
 Test 1 is a successful experiment of the ability of the DCBDA process to create a 
tailored EML for the attack scenario.  This EML is used to collect and analyze specific 
evidence found on the target system.  The evidence results, summarized in Table 34, 
show the attack scenario of a successful ICMP covert channel hidden by a rootkit and 
obfuscated by log manipulation.  This resulted in the positive identification of all forensic 
markers indicating a successful cyber attack action of Covering Tracks.   
 
Table 34.  Test 1 Results. 
Forensic Marker From EML Collection/Analysis Success
ptunnel.exe on system Yes
Suspicious ICMP traffic Yes
WinPCap installed Yes
Suspected Rootkit Activity Yes
Missing/incomplete logs Yes  
 
4.3.3. Test 2 Collection and Analysis 
 The tools identified in the EML in Table 32 are run on the system Test_2 as 
described in Table 23.  The results are listed in this Section.   
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 The first method for action is to use Event Viewer to identify any missing or 
incomplete logs.  Figure 29 shows the results of using Event Viewer to inspect the event 
logs.  The error is a clear indication of a log obfuscation attack action.  
 
  
Figure 29.  Event Viewer Results on Test_2. 
 
 The second method to use to collect evidence from Test 2 is the administrator 
program Services.  The EventLog service is inspected and Figure 30 shows the results.  
The service being disabled is a indicator of a log obfuscation attack action.   
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Figure 30.  Services Results on Test_2. 
 
 The third method for collection actions is to use ADS Scanner to search for all 
active ADS.  The scanner is loaded and run on Test 2.  The findings in Figure 31 depict 
two active ADS on the system.  This activity is suspicious and the name of bad.exe is an 
indication of a cyber attack.   
 
 
Figure 31.  ADS Scanner Results on Test_2. 
 
102 
 
 The last forensic method and tool identified for action in the EML is to use File 
Scavenger to identify removed files indicating an attacker presence.  The tool is run on 
the target system and the tool identified suspicious files and recently deleted files.  These 
actions, shown in Figure 32, show that Company Sales Plan.lnk and Company Secrets.lnk 
shortcuts exist, but the files they are linked to do not exist.  This is an indication of an 
attacker attempting to delete these files as part of an attack file obfuscation action.  Also 
discovered, as shown in Figure 33, were three documents removed from the Recycle Bin.  
These files were not able to be recovered, but the time stamps are very close to the 
previously identified links.  All of the identifiers found by the File Scavenger program 
indicate a Covering Tracks cyber attack. 
 
 
Figure 32.  File Scavenger Suspicious File Links Found on Test_2. 
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Figure 33.  File Scavenger Suspicious Deleted Files Found on Test_2. 
 
4.3.4. Test 2 Report and Results 
 This Section is the forensic analysis report for this second test and is the final 
product of this DCBDA process.  The determination of the assessment is a successful 
cyber attack was executed against the target.  The EventLog service is disabled, two ADS 
files are discovered and suspicious documents are deleted from the system.  These actions 
acted as the weapons used in a Covering Tracks maneuver.   
 Test 2 is a successful experiment of the ability of the DCBDA process to create a 
tailored EML for the attack scenario.  This EML is used to collect and analyze specific 
evidence found on the target system.  The evidence results, summarized in Table 35, 
show the attack scenario of an attacker covering attack action tracks by deleting files, 
creating ADS to hide executables and the disablement of the Event Logs service.  This 
resulted in the positive identification of all forensic markers indicating a successful cyber 
attack action of Covering Tracks.   
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Table 35.  Test 2 Results. 
Forensic Marker From EML Collection/Analysis Success
Missing/incomplete logs Yes
Disable EventLog service Yes
System search for all active ADS Yes
Files removed Yes  
 
4.3.5. Test 3 Collection and Analysis 
 The tools identified in the EML in Table 33 are run on the system Test_3 as 
described in Table 24.  The results are listed in this Section.   
 The first method for action is to use the program StegDetect to find any 
suspicious files for Steganography.  The suspicious file Winter.jpg is identified on the 
user's Desktop from a basic search looking for suspicious picture files.  StegDetect is 
used against the file with no success as shown in Figure 34.  This is not an event of 
concern, due to the EML having more than one method identified for Steganography 
detection.   
 
 
Figure 34.  StegDetect Negative Results for Test 3. 
 
 The second method identified for use to collect evidence on Test 3 is StegSpy.  
This program is used on the suspicious file Winter.jpg.  As shown in Figure 35, this 
identified forensic tool is not able to identify the file as having Steganography used to 
cover an attacker's actions.   
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Figure 35.  StegSpy Negative Results for Test 3. 
 
 The final method to identify forensic evidence is to identify suspicious time 
attributes associated to any file on the Test 3 system.  The command "dir c:\ /A /S /T:W" 
is run and each time value is analyzed.  The result, as shown in Figure 36, depicts the 
Winter.jpg file having a modified time value as the time is earlier than any other on the 
system.  This indicates an attacker having modified the values to cover an attack action.   
 
 
 Figure 36.  File Time Attribute Analysis Results for Test 3. 
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4.3.6. Test 3 Report and Results 
 This Section is the forensic analysis report for test number three and is the final 
product of this DCBDA process.  The determination of the assessment is a successful 
cyber attack was executed against the target, with exception.  The Winter.jpg is identified 
as being a suspicious file with confirmed invalid time attributes.  The exception lies in the 
inability of the identified forensic steganalysis programs to identify a file being used to 
hide data.  The EML still identified a Covering Tracks attacker action, but the finding on 
this test is the evidence analysis used for the EML must be accomplished again to 
properly identify steganography files such as Winter.jpg.   
 Test 3 is a successful experiment of the ability of the DCBDA process to create a 
tailored EML for the attack scenario.  This EML is used to collect and analyze specific 
evidence found on the target system.  The evidence results, summarized in Table 36, 
show the attack scenario of an attacker covering attack action tracks by modification of 
suspicious file time attributes.  More work is needed to determine the extent of the 
forensic evidence of the cyber attack which occurred for this test.   
 
Table 36.  Test 3 Results. 
Forensic Marker From EML Collection/Analysis Success
Suspicious files/sizes No
Suspicious files/sizes No
Suspicious file time values Yes  
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4.4. Overall Experiment Results 
 This Section offers an overall summary to the results of the experiment used for 
this experiment.   
4.4.1. Create the CAMEL and CAMAT Results: Success 
 The CAMEL and CAMAT are created for the cyber attack methodology and the 
data is used for the experimentation of the DCBDA process.  The notable findings are the 
importance of attack action data, the importance of proper evidence marker analysis and 
the sensitivity of conglomerated information concerning attack methodology.   
4.4.2. DCBDA Preparation Results: Success 
 The preparation phase of the DCBDA process is conducted using the CAMEL 
and CAMAT.  The process created the ASL with three attack scenarios created for this 
experiment.  Three respective EMLs were created as well.  The notable findings for this 
part of the experimentation are the importance of capability analysis and data within the 
EMLs.   
4.4.3. Experimentation to Verify DCBDA Results: Success With Exception 
 The forensic analysis of three test systems is accomplished to complete the 
DCBDA process and verify if the process has the ability to properly identify a cyber 
attack.  The experiments are a success with one exception of an inadequate EML to fully 
identify all factors of the evidence of the cyber attack.   
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4.4.4. Overall Experiment Results Summary 
 The results of this experimentation are summarized in Table 37. 
 
Table 37.  DCBDA Process Experimentation Results. 
DCBDA EML Forensic Evidence Match Result 
Test 1 Success 
Test 2 Success 
Test 3 Success (with exception) 
 
4.5. Experimentation and Results Summary 
 In this chapter the experiment and results are discussed.  The scope of the 
experiment is outlined.  The creation of the CAMEL through attack action collection, 
attack method analysis, evidence analysis, forensic tool and method analysis is covered.  
The modeling of the CAMAT for this experiment is shown.  The completion of the 
DCBDA preparation phase to include attack tree creation is discussed.  Finally the 
experimentation of the DCBDA process is conducted with three tests of the forensic 
analysis phase. 
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V. Conclusions 
 This chapter discusses the conclusions of the research effort and possible 
considerations for future research.  Section 5.1 contains the research summary and 
objective overview.  Section 5.2 provides several recommendations for extending the 
DCBDA research.  Section 5.3 contains concluding remarks to include the contributions 
of this research. 
5.1. Research Summary 
 The primary goal of this research is to provide robust defensive cyber battle 
damage assessment capabilities through digital forensic analysis tailored by an 
understanding of the attack methodology.  The CAMEL is developed to facilitate this 
comprehensive understanding of the cyber attack.  The DCBDA process is outlined and 
the process is verified through active forensic analysis experiments.  The following 
Sections discuss each research objective to determine if they have been met from this 
research effort.   
5.1.1. Develop the CAMEL and CAMAT 
 The exhaustive listing of the cyber attack methodology allows for the intelligence 
preparation of the operating environment to directly impact the capabilities of the 
DCBDA process.  CAMEL gives an organization a wealth of detailed attack information 
to bolster their abilities to provide timely, accurate and detailed assessments of a cyber 
attack.  This research shows the proposed CAMEL process can be used to tailor the cyber 
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damage assessment process when properly populated with accurate information.  This 
process can increase accuracy, timeliness and capabilities of future technical damage 
assessments from cyber attacks. 
5.1.2. Develop the DCBDA Process 
 The objective in defining the Defensive Cyber Battle Damage Assessment process 
is to develop a procedure which utilized a comprehensive wealth of information 
regarding cyber attack mythologies.  The research shows the proposed two phase process 
allows tailored damage assessments to utilize the wealth of information in the CAMEL. 
5.1.3. Verify the DCBDA Process 
 The purpose of this objective is to verify the proposed CAMEL and DCBDA 
processes would correctly identify a cyber attack.  Through the execution of three 
experimental tests the processes are proven effective and able to deliver tailored damage 
assessment for a given cyber attack.  The findings of these experiments should be used to 
improve the research and be considered for any operational implementation of the 
proposed procedures.   
5.2. Future Work 
 Utilizing attack methodology modeling for enhanced cyber BDA has many 
avenues for further research.  The following Section discusses possible areas for 
consideration to further develop this research topic. 
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5.2.1. Real Time DCBDA 
 Through the course of this research it was discovered that extending the cyber 
attack tree model to include more information would allow for a bottom-up identification 
of an attack.  Future work could explore the possibility of identifying and modeling 
sensor alerts from a cyber attack through the CAMAT.  Real time sensor alerts could then 
be followed up the tree to the attack tool the sensor alerted on, and then to the attack 
action(s) the tool is used for.  From here, incident responders could use the detailed 
knowledge modeled in the cyber attack tree to increase their ability to pinpoint an 
ongoing attack.  Figure 37 shows how the DCBDA process could potentially be extended 
to allow for this future work.  This figure shows how the sensor data and attack action 
correlation can be found in the cyber attack tree. 
5.2.2. Mission Impact Framework Incorporation 
 While it is understood that mission impact is not the same as damage assessment, 
mission impact analysis is still very dependent on efforts like this research.  Future work 
could refine or further develop the DCBDA process to provide all the necessary 
information for the best possible integration into a mission impact framework.  Research 
conducted by Captain Lisa S. Thiem showed in a case study of damage assessment on Air 
Force networks that the focus on damage assessment was exclusively on technical 
assessments and in some cases had no connection to higher level applications of the 
damage assessment [Thi05].  The DCBDA process could also be incorporated into higher 
level mission impact framework research [For07].  Mission impact fusion into the 
DCBDA process can work to alleviate this problem. 
112 
 
 
 
Figure 37.  Real Time DCBDA.  
5.2.3. Host-Based Security System Integration 
 Host-Based Security System (HBSS) is the Defense Information Systems 
Agency's (DISA) security framework.  The ability to incorporate a battle damage 
assessment function into the HBSS suite which could be administered from a remote 
location would be extremely beneficial for incident response actions.  Another system for 
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possible DCBDA process integration is CyberCraft [KaP07].  This integration could lead 
to a true attack awareness module benefiting from the DCBDA process outlined in this 
research.  This function could be implemented as a forensic agent. 
 Figure 38 depicts a plausible solution to this problem building on the proposed 
real time DCBDA research.   
 
Figure 38.  Notional Automated DCBDA Diagram. 
 
 Sensor data from a detection system on the asset or the network the asset uses is 
input into the cyber attack model.  This sensor data is then matched in the DCBDA cyber 
attack tree model to an evidence marker.  This marker then identifies a forensic tool the 
agent can use to retrieve the data from the target.  The forensic agent then retrieves the 
identified tool from a notional Forensic Tool Depot collection of tools and executes the 
tool, forwarding the results for analysis.  This proposed research would need to develop a 
method to automate the tool selection from the attack data provided from a sensor.  This 
automation would entail attack scenario analysis and evidence evaluation covered in this 
thesis research.   
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5.2.4. Threat Agent Profiling Applied to Attack Tree Analysis 
 This future work effort would seek to expand the capabilities based analysis 
conducted on the attack tree model.  Intelligence on a threat agent profile could be 
applied to the attack tree to further refine selected attack scenarios and evidence markers.  
This future research area concerns the possible use of studied attack indicators and threat 
agent profiles to generate pruned attack trees for tailored, efficient and effective forensic 
analysis [Kle01].  This hacker profiling could also lead to the application of behavior 
pattern analysis modeling.  These behavior profiles may be applied to the attack tree 
model, as part of the DCBDA process.  This can be done by weighing the nodes in the 
tree with values associated with the profile used.  This future work would incorporate 
threat profile studies, such as the insider threat, to prune the modeled attack tree 
methodology for a tailored, targeted analysis.    
5.2.5. Defense Tree Model 
 Defense tree modeling is closely linked to attack tree modeling.  While attack tree 
modeling focuses on the actions needed to complete an attack root goal, defense 
modeling centers on the goal of mitigating an attack and the actions taken to support that 
goal.  The focus of this future research area would be to incorporate a defense tree model 
into the DCBDA process.  Related work in this area has shown that a close and beneficial 
relationship can be shown between the two models [LHS03] [EkS09].  This defense 
model could be used in conjunction with the attack model to form better evidence 
markers and as a result work to bolster network defense efforts.   
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5.3. Concluding Remarks 
 This research contributed a robust systematic process to capture and utilize the 
comprehensive knowledge of cyber attack methodology for cyber battle damage 
assessment.  This work is unique from other research in that it focuses on bolstering the 
capabilities of the technical damage assessment portion of an organization's ability to 
determine impact of malicious cyber events.   
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Appendix A.  Attack Vector Categories 
Table 38.  Attack Vectors Categories [DOD09]. 
Attack Vector 
Category Number Description 
1 
Sub-category 
Reconnaissance: Information was accessible and used to 
characterize DOD systems, applications, networks, and users 
that may be useful in formulating an attack. 
A 
Information Gathering and Data Mining: Activity that seeks to 
gather information from publicly available sources. 
B 
Network Scan: Activity that targets multiple IP addresses. This 
is referred to as a horizontal scan. 
C 
System Scan: Activity that targets a single IP address across a 
range of ports. This is referred to as a vertical scan. 
2 
Sub-category 
Authorized User: A user with authorized access took specific 
actions that resulted in jeopardizing DOD systems or data. 
A 
Purposeful: An authorized user knowingly took specific 
actions that jeopardized DOD systems or data. 
B 
Accidental: An authorized user took actions that had 
consequences over and above the intentions and jeopardized 
DOD systems or data. 
3 
Sub-category 
Social Engineering: Human interaction (social skills) or 
deception used to gain access to resources or information. 
A 
E-mail: E-mail is the primary vehicle used to deliver a 
malicious payload or gain access to resources or information. 
B 
Web site: A Web site is the primary vehicle used to deliver a 
malicious payload or gain access to resources or information. 
C 
Other: A user was deceived or manipulated in a way that is not 
covered by the other types of social engineering. 
 
117 
 
Table 39.  Attack Vectors Categories Continued [DOD09]. 
4 
Sub-category 
Configuration Management: Compromise resulting from the 
inadequate or improper configuration of an information 
system. 
A 
Network: A system that provides network-based services was 
improperly or inadequately configured. 
B 
Operating System: An operating system was improperly or 
inadequately configured. 
C 
Application: An application was improperly or inadequately 
configured. 
5 Sub-category 
Software Flaw: A vulnerability in the software that allows for 
the unauthorized use of or access to an information system in a 
way that violates the system’s security policy. 
 
A 
Exploited New Vulnerability: This vulnerability was unknown 
prior to the event or there was no mechanism available to 
prevent it. 
 
B 
Exploited Known Vulnerability: This vulnerability was known 
prior to the event and there was a mechanism available to 
prevent it. 
6 
Sub-category 
Transitive Trust: Compromise resulting from the implicit or 
explicit trust relationship between security domains. 
A 
Other System Compromise: Compromise resulting from access 
previously gained on another DOD system. 
B 
Masquerading: Compromise resulting from the unauthorized 
use of a valid user’s credentials. This may include 
cryptographic material, account credentials, or other 
identification information. 
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Table 40.  Attack Vectors Categories Continued [DOD09]. 
 
7 
Sub-category 
Resource Exhaustion: The consumption of system resources 
that prevents legitimate users from accessing a resource, 
service, or information. 
A 
Non-Distributed Network Activity: Activity from a single IP 
address that overwhelms system or network resources. This is 
generally associated with a DoS incident. 
B 
Distributed Network Activity: Activity from multiple IP 
addresses that overwhelms system or network resources. This 
is generally associated with a DoS incident. 
8 
Sub-category 
Physical Access: The unauthorized physical access to 
resources. 
A 
Mishandled or lost resource: Equipment was stolen, lost, or left 
accessible to unauthorized parties. 
B 
Local access to system: An unauthorized user was provided 
local physical access to a DOD information resource. 
C 
Abuse of resources: The physical destruction of an information 
resource by an unauthorized party. 
9 
Sub-category Other 
A 
New Attack Vector: The attack vector is not covered by the 
listed methods. Description of the attack vector must be 
included in the incident comments. 
10 
Sub-category Unknown 
A 
Unable to determine: Attack vector could not be determined 
with the information available. 
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Appendix B.  CAMEL Attack Action Data 
Table 41.  CAMEL Attack Action Data. 
Attack Action
Parent 
Action(s)
Child 
Action(s)
Attack 
Vector Attack Results/Goal
Risk of 
Discover Impact
Reconnaissance
Cyber 
Attack Ping, Whois 9a
This is the initial information 
gathering action of a cyber attack L M
Ping
Reconnaissa
nce 1a
This action attempts to connect 
to an asset on the target network L M
Whois
Reconnaissa
nce 1a
This action enumerations domain 
information L H
Scanning
Cyber 
Attack
Port Scanning, 
Network 
Mapping 1a
This is the active information 
gathering action for a cyber 
attack L H
Port Scanning Scanning 1b
This action determines open 
ports of the assets on a target 
network L H
Network Mapping Scanning 1b
This action maps the assets of the 
target network M M
Gain Access
Cyber 
Attack
Password 
Attack, Web 
Application 
Attack 2
This action seeks to gain access 
to an asset H H
Password Attack Gain Access 2a
This action attempts to use a 
password for access L H
Web Application 
Attack Gain Access 3b
This action gains access through a 
web application L H
Maintain Access
Cyber 
Attack
Backdoor, 
Trojan 5
This action seeks to maintain 
access after intial entry is gained H H
Backdoor
Maintain 
Access 5b
This action installs a backdoor for 
later use by the attacker H H
Trojan
Maintain 
Access 5b
This action leaves embedded 
attack programs running L H
Covering Tracks
Cyber 
Attack
Log 
Obfuscation, 
Attack Data 
Obfuscation, 
Persistent 
Access 
Obfuscation, 
Covert 
Channel 5
This is the action an attacker 
does to hide unauthorized actions 
taken on a target system L H
Log Obfuscation
Covering 
Tracks
Fake Log 
Entries, Erase 
Logs, Disable 
Auditing, 
Overwrite Logs 4
This is the targeted manipulation 
of a system's logging capability to 
obfuscate an attack L H
Attack Data 
Obfuscation
Covering 
Tracks
Hide Attack 
Data, Delete 
Attack Files 4
This is the removal of attacker 
files L H  
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Table 42.  CAMEL Attack Action Data Continued. 
Attack Action
Parent 
Action(s) Child Action(s)
Attack 
Vector Attack Results/Goal
Risk of 
Discover Impact
Persistent Access 
Obfuscation
Covering 
Tracks Rootkit 4
This is the removal of unauthorized 
persitent access indicators L H
Covert Channel
Covering 
Tracks
ICMP Covert Channel, 
HTTP Covert Channel, 
DNS Covert Channel, 
TCP Covert Channel, 
802.11 Covert Tunnel 4a,4b
This action installs a covert channel to 
obfuscate remote calls to persistent 
attack files L H
Hide Attack Data
Attack File 
Obfuscation
Steganography, Alternate 
Data Stream, T ime 
Stamp Alteration, Hide 
Files/Folders 4b
This action hides attack data on the 
system from discovery L H
Alternate Data 
Stream
Hide Attack 
Data 4b
This action forks extended data onto a 
file, this is used by an attacker to hide 
attack data L H
Steganography
Hide Attack 
Data 2a
This action hides attack data in non-
hidden files L H
Time Stamp 
Alteration
Hide Attack 
Data 2a
This action modifies the time attribute 
values for a file L H
Hide Files/Folders
Hide Attack 
Data 2a
This action modifies the hidden flag 
for a file/folder H M
Delete Attack Files
Attack File 
Obfuscation
Delete Prefetch, Delete 
Browsing History, Delete 
Clipboard Data, Delete 
Shell History, Delete 
"Recent" History 2a
This action is the deletion of attack 
tools L M
Delete Prefetch
Delete Attack 
Files 2a
Remove attack data from the prefetch 
data L M
Delete Browsing 
History
Delete Attack 
Files 2a
Remove attack data from any browsing 
history L M
Delete Clipboard 
Data
Delete Attack 
Files 2a
Remove from the clipboard of any 
attack data L M
Delete Shell 
History
Delete Attack 
Files 2a Remove data from the shell L L
Delete "Recent" 
History
Delete Attack 
Files 2a
Remove recent activity from the 
system M M
Disable Auditing
Log 
Obfuscation 2a
Disable system auditing of actions 
taken M H
Overwrite Logs
Log 
Obfuscation 2a
This action creates events that 
overwrite events that the attacker 
wishes to hide/erase L H
Fake Log Entries
Log 
Obfuscation
Delete Log Entry, Add 
Log Entry 4b
This action creates false log entries to 
obfuscate attack actions L H
Delete Log Entry
Fake Log 
Entries 4b This action deletes attack log entries L H
Add Log Entry
Fake Log 
Entries 4b
This action adds to the log entries to 
hide attack data L H
Erase Logs
Log 
Obfuscation
Erase System Logs, Erase 
Application Logs, Erase 
Security Logs 4b
This action erases logs on a target 
system H L  
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Table 43.  CAMEL Attack Action Data Continued. 
Attack Action
Parent 
Action(s) Child Action(s)
Attack 
Vector Attack Results/Goal
Risk of 
Discover Impact
Erase System Logs Erase Logs 4b This action erases system logs H L
Erase Application 
Logs Erase Logs 4b This action erases application logs H L
Erase Security Logs Erase Logs 4b This action erases security logs H L
Rootkit
Persistent 
Access 
Obfuscation, 
Hide Attack 
Data
Kernel rootkit , User 
rootkit , Firmware Rootkit , 
Virtualized Rootkit , 
Application Rootkit 5a
This action installs a rootkit  to hide 
attack data L H
Kernel Rootkit Rootkit 5a,5b
This action installs a kernel level rootkit  
to hide attack data L H
User Rootkit Rootkit 5a,5b
This action installs a user level rootkit  to 
hide attack data L H
Application 
Rootkit Rootkit 5a,5b
This action installs a rootkit  in an 
application H M
Virtualized Rootkit Rootkit 5a,5b
This action installs a rootkit  in a virtual 
hardware N/A N/A
Firmware Rootkit Rootkit 5a,5b This action installs a rootkit  in firmware L L
ICMP Covert 
Channel
Covert 
Channel 4a,4b
This action installs an ICMP covert 
channel M H
HTTP Covert 
Channel
Covert 
Channel 4a,4b
This action installs a HTTP covert 
channel H H
DNS Covert 
Channel
Covert 
Channel 4a,4b This action installs a DNS covert channel L H
TCP Covert 
Tunnel
Covert 
Channel 4a,4b This action installs a TCP covert channel H L
802.11 Covert 
Tunnel
Covert 
Channel 4a,4b
This action installs a wireless covert 
channel N/A N/A
 
  
122 
 
Appendix C.  CAMEL Attack Method Data 
Table 44.  CAMEL Attack Method Data. 
Attack Method Attack Action Attack Method Description Source
rcovert
802.11 Covert 
Tunnel Covert channel using valid ACK frames http://rfakeap.tuxfamily.org/
cmd: type
Alternate Data 
Stream Command line type
http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Alternat
e_Data_Streams.html
cmd: cp
Alternate Data 
Stream Command line type [MSK05]
AFX Windows RootKit Application Rootkit System patch to hide information
http://www.megasecurity.org/trojans/a/aphex/Af
x_win_rootkit2003.html
Evidence Eliminator Delete Attack Files Erase temp files, histories, recent documents http://www.evidence-eliminator.com/
Tracks Eraser Pro Delete Attack Files Erase temp files, histories, recent documents http://www.acesoft.net/
Netcat Backdoor Backdoor remote access program http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/139
ZeroTracks
Delete browsing 
history Erase temp files, histories, recent documents http://zerotracks.en.softonic.com/
cmd: del windows\prefetch Delete Prefetch use shell to delete files
AuditPol Disable Auditing
Windows NT Resource Kit for system 
administrators
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/cc731451(WS.10).aspx
Disable EventLog service Disable Auditing Disable EventLog service on startup http://support.microsoft.com/kb/172156
Iodine
DNS Covert 
Tunnel IPv4 data through a DNS server http://code.kryo.se/iodine/
DNSCat
DNS Covert 
Tunnel
bi-directional communication through DNS 
servers http://tadek.pietraszek.org/projects/DNScat/
TCP-over-DNS
DNS Covert 
Tunnel
contains a special dns server and a special dns 
client http://analogbit.com/tcp-over-dns_howto
elsave Erase logs
ELSave is a tool to save and/or clear a NT 
event log. http://www.ibt.ku.dk/jesper/ELSave/
ClearLogs Erase Logs
ClearLogs clears the event log (Security, 
System or Application) that you specify http://www.ntsecurity.nu/toolbox/clearlogs/
Evidence Eliminator Erase Logs Erase logs http://www.evidence-eliminator.com/
WinZapper Fake Log Entries erase event records selectively http://www.ntsecurity.nu/toolbox/winzapper/
Alureon Firmware Rootkit Win 7 MBR modifications
http://www.virusbtn.com/pdf/conference_slides/2
010/Johnson-VB2010.pdf
File hidden option
Hidden option on 
file hidden' option is selected for the file
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/using/help
andsupport/learnmore/tips/hiddenfiles.mspx  
  
123 
 
Table 45.  CAMEL Attack Method Data Continued. 
Attack 
Method Attack Action Attack Method Description Source
cmd: attrib +h Hide Files/Folders cmd: attrib +h
http://www.microsoft.com/resource
s/documentation/windows/xp/all/pr
oddocs/en-us/attrib.mspx?mfr=true
Hide Folders 
2009 Hide folder
can make your files and folders inaccessible, 
invisible or protect them from http://www.fspro.net/hide-folders/
Folder hidden 
option Hide folder hidden' option is selected for the folder
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
US/windows-vista/Show-hidden-
files
Hopster HTTP Covert Tunnel Client bypasses proxy servers http://www.hopster.com/
httptunnel HTTP Covert Tunnel
httptunnel creates a bidirectional virtual data 
connection tunnelled in HTTP requests
http://www.nocrew.org/software/ht
tptunnel.html
ptunnel IMCP Covert Tunnel
Tunnel TCP connections to a remote host using 
ICMP echo request/reply
http://www.neophob.com/2007/10/
pingtunnel-for-windows-icmp-
tunnel/
Fu Kernel Rootkit DKOM to hide processes
https://www.rootkit.com/vault/fuzen
_op/FU_README.txt
Cheops-ng Network Mapping
Network management tool for mapping and 
monitoring your network http://cheops-ng.sourceforge.net/
Brutus Password Attack Remote password cracker http://www.hoobie.net/brutus/
ICMP Echo 
requests Ping Send ICMP echo request to target
http://www.microsoft.com/resource
s/documentation/windows/xp/all/pr
oddocs/en-us/ping.mspx?mfr=true
nmap Port Scanning Port scanning tool http://nmap.org/
Steghide Steganography hide data in various kinds of image- and audio-files http://steghide.sourceforge.net/
wbStego4open Steganography
steganography in bitmaps, text files, HTML files 
and PDF files http://wbstego.wbailer.com/
Snow Steganography
conceal messages in ASCII text by appending 
whitespace
http://www.darkside.com.au/snow/i
ndex.html
ncovert TCP Covert Tunnel hide network file transfers across the Internet http://ncovert.sourceforge.net/
Timestomp
Time Stamp 
Alteration modifies the time attribute values for a file
http://www.blackhat.com/presentati
ons/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-foster-liu-
update.pdf
Beast Trojan Backdoor program
http://h4ck3r.in/board/showthread.
php?tid=171  
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Table 46.  CAMEL Attack Method Data Continued. 
Attack Method Attack Action Attack Method Description Source
Vanquish User Rootkit
Processes, Handles, Modules, Files & Folders, Registry 
Values, Services https://www.rootkit.com/vault/xshadow/ReadMe.txt
Hacker Defender User Rootkit User rootkit to hide processes http://www.rootkit.com/board_project_fused.php?did=proj5
Nuclear User Rootkit Hide processes, directories, registry, connections
http://www.nuclearwintercrew.com/Products-
View/63/Nuclear_Rootkit_1.0/
Blue Pill Virtualized Rootkit x86 virtualization rootkit http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2006/06/introducing-blue-pill.html
WebScarab
Web Application 
Attack Analyze HTTP applications
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Pro
ject
Samspade Whois Network query tool
http://www.pcworld.com/downloads/file/fid,4709-order,1-page,1-
c,alldownloads/description.html  
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Appendix D.  CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data 
Table 47.  CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data. 
Attack Action / 
Method Forensic Marker Forensic Tools
Evidence 
Confidence Evidence Source
ICMP Echo 
requests
ICMP ping incoming 
and outgoing Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Samspade
Ping, SMTP VFRY, 
web site activity Wireshark M
http://majorgeeks.com/Sam_S
pade_d594.html
nmap
Port scanning, OS 
enum Wireshark H http://nmap.org/
Cheops-ng
Port scanning, OS 
enum Wireshark M
http://cheops-
ng.sourceforge.net/screenshots
.php
Brutus
Failed login attempts 
in log PyFlag H
http://www.webhostgear.com/
240.html
WebScarab Malformed data Wireshark H
http://www.owasp.org/index.p
hp/Category:OWASP_WebS
carab_Project
Netcat
suspicious open 
ports netstat H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/bb490947.aspx
Beast
Suspicious Trojan 
activity Regedit.exe H
http://www.exterminate-
it.com/malpedia/remove-
beast#howfiles
cmd: del 
windows\prefetch 
windows\prefetch 
missing cmd H
Hide Folders 
2009 Hidden folders cmd L
http://www.fspro.net/hide-
folders/
Folder hidden 
option Hidden folders cmd L
http://www.microsoft.com/win
dowsxp/using/helpandsupport/
learnmore/tips/hiddenfiles.msp
x
File hidden option Hidden files cmd L
http://www.microsoft.com/win
dowsxp/using/helpandsupport/
learnmore/tips/hiddenfiles.msp
x
Steghide Suspicious files/sizes Stegdetect H
http://www.outguess.org/detec
tion.php   
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Table 48.  CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data Continued. 
Attack Action / 
Method
Forensic 
Marker Forensic Tools
Evidence 
Confidence Evidence Source
wbStego4open
Suspicious 
files/sizes Hashkeeper M
http://www.garykessler.net/libr
ary/fsc_stego.html
Snow
Suspicious 
files/sizes Stegdetect H
http://www.outguess.org/detec
tion.php
cmd: type
Suspicious 
files/sizes
Streams, 
ADSTools, 
ADS Scanner, 
ADS Spy L
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897440.aspx
cmd: cp
Suspicious 
files/sizes
Streams, 
ADSTools, 
ADS Scanner, 
ADS Spy L
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897440.aspx
cmd: attrib +h Hidden files cmd H
http://www.microsoft.com/win
dowsxp/using/helpandsupport/
learnmore/tips/hiddenfiles.msp
x
Timestomp
Suspicious time 
MACE values
dir c:\ /A /S 
/T:W M
http://www.microsoft.com/res
ources/documentation/window
s/xp/all/proddocs/en-
us/ntcmds.mspx?mfr=true
ZeroTracks Files removed
Recuva, File 
Scavenger M
http://www.kleinsoft.co.za/pro
ducts.html
Evidence 
Eliminator Files removed
Recuva, File 
Scavenger M
http://windows.microsoft.com/
en-US/windows7/Recover-
lost-or-deleted-files
Tracks Eraser Pro Files removed
Recuva, File 
Scavenger M
http://windows.microsoft.com/
en-US/windows7/Recover-
lost-or-deleted-files
AuditPol 
Missing/incomple
te logs Event Viewer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/cc766042.aspx
Disable EventLog 
service
Disabled 
EventLog service Services H
http://www.microsoft.com/res
ources/documentation/window
s/xp/all/proddocs/en-
us/cpanel_admintools.mspx?m
fr=true  
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Table 49.  CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data Continued. 
Attack Action / 
Method
Forensic 
Marker Forensic Tools
Evidence 
Confidence Evidence Source
Evidence 
Eliminator
Missing/incom
plete logs Event Viewer H
http://windows.microsoft.com/
en-US/windows7/Recover-
lost-or-deleted-files
WinZapper
Missing/incom
plete logs Event Viewer H
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa385780(v=vs.85).
aspx
ClearLogs
Missing/incom
plete logs Event Viewer H
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa385780(v=vs.85).
aspx
Vanquish
VANQUISH.
DLL RootkitRevealer H
http://www.rootkit.com/newsr
ead.php?newsid=35
Hacker Defender hxdef.exe RootkitRevealer H
http://www.carnal0wnage.com
/papers/rootkit_for_the_masse
s.pdf
Nuclear
c:\WINDOWS
\nkit.dll RootkitRevealer H
http://www.nuclearwintercrew.
com/Products-
Screenshot/63/Nuclear_Rootk
it_1.0/
Fu PspCidTable
RootkitRevealer, F-
Secure Blacklight H [DBM09]
DNS2TCP
suspicious 
traffic over 
port 53 Wireshark H
http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/o
utils/dns2tcp/index.html.en
Iodine
suspicious 
traffic over 
port 53 Wireshark H http://www.securitywire.com/
Iodine TAP32 driver cmd H
DNSCat
suspicious 
DNS, Java 
1.4+ installed Wireshark H
http://tadek.pietraszek.org/proj
ects/DNScat/
TCP-over-DNS
suspicious 
traffic over 
port 53 Wireshark H
http://analogbit.com/tcp-over-
dns_howto
ICMP Covert 
Channel
suspicious 
ICMP traffic Wireshark H
http://www.cs.uit.no/~daniels/
PingTunnel/  
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Table 50.  CAMEL Evidence Analysis Data Continued. 
Attack Action 
/ Method Forensic Marker Forensic Tools
Evidence 
Confidence Evidence Source
ptunnel
ptunnel.exe on 
system cmd/search M
ptunnel WinPCap installed cmd/search H
http://www.neophob.com/2007/
10/pingtunnel-for-windows-
icmp-tunnel/
ncovert SIN as data field Wireshark H
http://www.blackhat.com/presen
tations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-
simplenomad/bh-us-03-
simplenomad.pdf
Hopster
Suspicious HTTP 
traffic Wireshark H http://www.hopster.com/
httptunnel
Suspicious HTTP 
traffic Wireshark H
http://www.nocrew.org/software
/httptunnel.html
rcovert Suspicious activity Wireshark H
http://rfakeap.tuxfamily.org/#Ra
w_Covert
Hans
Suspicious ICMP 
traffic Wireshark H http://code.gerade.org/hans/
Skeeve
Suspicious ICMP 
traffic Wireshark H
http://www.gray-
world.net/poc_skeeve.shtml
ICPMTX
Suspicious ICMP 
traffic Wireshark H http://thomer.com/icmptx/
Alureon Suspicious activity RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
Blue Pill Suspicious activity cmd L
http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.
com/2006/06/introducing-blue-
pill.html
AFX Windows 
RootKit Suspicious activity RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
DNS Covert 
Tunnel
Suspicious traffic 
over port 53 Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Rootkit
Suspected Rootkit 
Activity
RootkitRevealer, F-Secure 
Blacklight H
Alternate Data 
Stream
System search for 
all active ADS
Streams, ADSTools, ADS 
Scanner, ADS Spy H
http://www.pointstone.com/prod
ucts/ADS-Scanner/
 
  
129 
 
Appendix E.  CAMEL Tool and Method Data 
Table 51.  CAMEL Tool and Method Data. 
Forensic Marker
Forensic 
Tool/Method
Tool 
Confidence Tool/Method Source
ICMP ping incoming 
and outgoing Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Ping, SMTP VFRY, 
web site activity Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Port scanning, OS enum Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Port scanning, OS enum Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Failed login attempts in 
log PyFlag H
http://www.pyflag.net/cgi-
bin/moin.cgi
Malformed data Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
suspicious open ports netstat M
http://www.microsoft.com/resource
s/documentation/windows/xp/all/pro
ddocs/en-us/netstat.mspx?mfr=true
Suspicious Trojan 
activity Regedit.exe H
http://www.microsoft.com/resource
s/documentation/windows/xp/all/pro
ddocs/en-us/tools_regeditors.mspx
\windows\system32\con
fig missing cmd H
windows\prefetch 
missing cmd H
Suspicious files/sizes Stegdetect H
http://www.outguess.org/detection.p
hp
Hidden folders cmd H
Suspicious files/sizes StegSpy H
http://www.spy-
hunter.com/stegspydownload.htm
Suspicious files/sizes Hashkeeper M
http://www.justice.gov/ndic/domex/
hashkeeper.htm
Hidden files cmd H
Suspicious time 
Modified, Access, and 
Creation values
dir c:\ /A /S 
/T:W H
Files removed Recuva M http://www.piriform.com/recuva  
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Table 52.  CAMEL Tool and Method Data Continued. 
Forensic Marker
Forensic 
Tool/Method
Tool 
Confidence Tool/Method Source
VANQUISH.DLL RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
hxdef.exe RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
c:\WINDOWS\nkit.dll, 
c:\WINDOWS\Rootkit.
exe RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
PspCidTable RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
suspicious traffic over 
port 53 Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
suspicious ICMP traffic Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
ptunnel.exe on system cmd/search M
WinPCap installed cmd/search H
SIN as data field Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Suspicious HTTP traffic Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Suspicious activity Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Suspicious activity RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
Suspicious traffic over 
port 53 Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Suspicious traffic over 
port 53 Wireshark H http://www.wireshark.org/
Suspicious activity RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
Streams will examine the 
files and directories for 
streams Streams M
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897440.aspx
Searches drives & lists 
all files that have ADS ADSTools M
http://www.soft32.com/download_
207535.html
System search for all 
active ADS ADS Scanner M
http://www.pointstone.com/product
s/ADS-Scanner/
List, view or delete 
Alternate Data Streams 
(ADS) ADS Spy M
http://www.brothersoft.com/ads-
spy-74079.html  
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Table 53.  CAMEL Tool and Method Data Continued. 
Forensic Marker
Forensic 
Tool/Method
Tool 
Confidence Tool/Method Source
Suspected Rootkit activity RootkitRevealer H
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897445
Suspected Rootkit activity F-Secure Blacklight H
deleted files http://www.quetek.com/prod02.htm
deleted files Recycle Bin   
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Appendix F.  CAMEL Attack Action Metrics 
Table 54.  CAMEL Attack Action Metrics. 
Attack Action Risk of Discovery Impact
Reconnaissance L M
Ping L M
Whois L H
Scanning L H
Port Scanning L H
Network Mapping M M
Gain Access H H
Password Attack L H
Web Application 
Attack L H
Maintain Access H H
Backdoor H H
Trojan L H
Covering Tracks L H
Log Obfuscation L H
Attack Data 
Obfuscation L H
Persistent Access 
Obfuscation L H
Covert Channel L H
Hide Attack Data L H
Alternate Data Stream L H
Steganography L H
Time Stamp 
Alteration L H
Hide Files/Folders H M
Delete Attack Files L M
Delete Prefetch L M
Delete Browsing 
History L M
Delete Clipboard 
Data L M  
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Table 55.  CAMEL Attack Action Metrics Continued. 
Attack Action Risk of Discovery Impact
Delete Shell History L L
Delete "Recent" 
History M M
Disable Auditing M H
Overwrite Logs L H
Fake Log Entries L H
Delete Log Entry L H
Add Log Entry L H
Erase Logs H L
Erase System Logs H L
Erase Application 
Logs H L
Erase Security Logs H L
Rootkit L H
Kernel Rootkit L H
User Rootkit L H
Application Rootkit H M
Virtualized Rootkit N/A N/A
Firmware Rootkit L L
ICMP Covert 
Channel M H
HTTP Covert 
Channel H H
DNS Covert Channel L H
TCP Covert Tunnel H L
802.11 Covert Tunnel N/A N/A  
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Appendix G.  CAMEL Creation Outline 
CAMEL Creation Outline  
Create and model the Cyber Attack Methodology Exhaustive List (CAMEL).  CAMEL is 
comprised of attack actions, methods, metrics, evidence markers and the associated 
forensic tools. 
1. Gather attack action data 
 This is the attacker methodology detailed as a list of actions taken to achieve a 
 goal action. 
a. Name of action 
b. Parent action 
c. Child action 
d. Attack results 
e. Other (Attack vector, etc.) 
2. For each action collected, list all attack methods (tools, TTPs) 
 These are the methods used to create the action.  This is the procedure to produce 
 the act. 
a. Attack method  
b. Attack Action for method 
c. Attack category (Attack action method used for) 
d. Attack method description 
e. Attack method source  
3. For each action and method, list all evidence which identify it  
 This is the detailed fingerprinting of what the act and/or method 'does' when it 
 transpires on the target system. 
a. Name of evidence  
b. Attack action/method the evidence identifies 
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c. Forensic markers which will be collected  
d. Source for evidence marker 
4. For each evidence marker, list the associated tool to harvest the marker 
 This step details the forensic tools/TTPs which can collect the associated marker. 
a. Name of forensic marker 
b. Name of evidence it identifies 
c. Forensic tool to collect marker 
d. Source for forensic tool 
5. Assign metrics to each attack action 
 Each action now has attack method, evidence and collection method data 
 associated with it.  The capabilities of an action, as determined by the 
 organization using CAMEL, can now be assigned as metrics. 
a. Determine metrics for action 
b. Assign values to metrics 
6. Model the action, method, marker and metric in an attack tree 
 This is the graphical representation of the data collected in steps 1-5.  This model 
 is referred to as the Cyber Attack Methodology Attack Tree (CAMAT). 
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Appendix H.  Test Systems Setup 
Test_1 
1. WinPCap 4.1.2 installed.   
 The program WinPcap is downloaded from http://www.winpcap.org/.  Run the 
installer file WinPcap_4_1_2.exe on the system (next, next, I agree, install).   
2. ptunnel.exe used to create an ICMP tunnel to a receiving proxy previously 
setup.   
 Download ptun-rel1.zip from http://www.neophob.com/2007/10/pingtunnel-for-
windows-icmp-tunnel/ on both target and a designated proxy server.  Running 
ptunnel.exe -h will list help to include examples.   
Server: 
 A separate system is designated as a server.  This will act as the proxy, listening 
for and handling the incoming ptunnel icmp packets.  The server must run the following 
command with the device changed to the specific device of the system. 
 ptunnel -v 4 -c "\Device\NPF_{EED408B.....}" 
Client: 
 The victim system is the where the covert channel is installed and used to bypass 
firewalls.  The following command is run with options changed as appropriate: 
 ptunnel -p <SERVERIP> -lp 8000 -da <WEB-PROXY> -dp <PORT> -v 4 
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ServerIP is the IP of the server listening for the connections. 
Web-proxy is the web proxy of the local network. 
Port is the port to be used on the client (80 for web) 
 Now a web browser can be set up to use the running ptunnel port as the proxy 
server (127.0.0.1 for IP and the Port setup on the ptunnel command) connection for 
internet access.  SSH can also setup and  used.   
3. The FU rootkit used to hide the ptunnel.exe process.   
 Download the FU_rootkit from www.rootkit.com.  Find the process ID (PID) of 
the ptunnel.exe using Windows Task Manager.  Run the following command on the 
fu.exe file in the FU_rootkit EXE folder.  This will hide the putnnel.exe process.   
 fu -ph (PID) 
4. Evidence Eliminator used to clear the event logs of any trace of these actions. 
 Download the Evidence Eliminator version 6.03 tool from http://www.evidence-
eliminator.com/downloads.d2w.  The install file downloaded will be called insteelmd.exe.  
Run the install program agreeing (next, YES, next, finish).  This will install Evidence 
Eliminator on the system.  Now run the program.  This experiment assumes the retail 
version of the software is purchased.  This program will clear evidence of Recycle Bin, 
Application Logs, Temp Files, Internet Explorer cache, and Clipboard data. 
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Test_2 
1. The EventLogs service disabled in the Administrator tool: Services.   
 The Administrator tool Services is used to change the Startup type of Event Log 
to disabled.  Figure 39 shows the option that is changed to disable the service. 
 
 
Figure 39.  Test_2 Setup Event Log Service. 
 
 
2. Two Alternate Data Streams (ADS) created using the type cmd to hide 
notional attack executable bad.exe in calc.exe.   
 A malicious program (in this case a renamed copied executable file from the 
system) bad.exe is put in the alternate data stream of calc.exe.  Then calc.exe is hidden in 
notepad.exe thus creating two alternate data streams.  The following commands are used. 
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 type bad.exe > calc.exe:bad.exe 
 type calc.exe > notepad.exe:calc.exe 
3. Two txt files created, deleted and 'emptied' from Recycle Bin.   
 Two text files, Company Sales Plan,txt and Company Secrets.txt are created with 
notional data in the files.  These files are then deleted.  The Recycle Bin then ran the 
"Empty Recycle Bin" option.   
4. ZeroTracks used to remove browsing and recent file history.   
 The program SoftonicDownloader_for_zerotracks.exe is downloaded from the 
site: http://zerotracks.en.softonic.com.  The installer is executed, accepting and agreeing 
to all install options.  The installer then downloads the software for installation.  The 
Setup wizard then runs.  The wizard is completed using all default selections (next and 
install).   
 Once installed, the ZeroTracks program is run.  The options in ZeroTracks 
Windows Recent Docs and Internet Explorer Cache and History are used to clear 
(remove selected items) suspect associated files.  Figures 40 and 41 show the ZeroTracks 
window used to delete the browsing and recent file history.   
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Figure 40.  Test_2 Setup Zero Tracks Clear Windows Recent Docs.  
 
Figure 41.  Test_2 Setup Zero Tracks Clear IE Cache & History. 
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Test_3 Setup 
1. Create secrets.txt file 
 For this step of the test setup, create a text file to hold data to be exfiltrated.  In 
this case, secrets.txt was created with notional data in the file.   
2. Use steghide-0.5.1-win32 to hide secrets.txt into winter.jpg.   
 Use the program steghide-0.5.1-win32, retrieved from 
http://steghide.sourceforge.net to hide the secrets.txt file in a jpg file.  In this case the file 
Winter.jpg file was used.  The following steghide command was used.   
 steghide embed -cf Winter.jpg -ef secrets.txt 
 A passphrase was given and secrets.txt was embedded into Winter.jpg via the 
steganography tool steghide.   
3. Use timestomp.exe to modify time value of winter.jpg to Monday 1/1/2001 
01:01:01 AM 
 Timestomp was downloaded from 
http://www.metasploit.com/data/antiforensics/timestomp.exe.  The following command 
was executed using the timestomp tool to modify Winter.jpg file time attributes.   
 timestomp Winter.jpg -z "Monday 1/01/2001 01:01:01 AM" 
 
  
142 
 
Bibliography 
[Ame04] Amenaza,  (2004, May),  "Understanding Risk Through Attack Tree Analysis,"  
 Amenaza Technologies Limited,  [Online],  Accessed 9 Dec 2010, 
  http://www.amenaza.com/downloads/docs/Methodology.pdf. 
 
[Ame05] Amenaza,  (2005, Nov),  "Fundamentals of Capabilities-based Attack Tree 
 Analysis,"  Amenaza Technologies Limited,  [Online],  Accessed 9 Dec 2010, 
  http://www.amenaza.com/downloads/docs/AttackTreeFundamentals.pdf. 
 
[Amo94] E. G. Amoroso,  (1994),  Fundamentals of Computer Security Technology, 
 Prentice-Hall Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA.  
 
[Bos02] S. Bosworth,  (2002),  Computer Security Handbook (4th ed.), M. E. Kabay 
 (Ed.),  John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, USA. 
 
[Coh87] F. Cohen, (1987, Feb),  "Computer Viruses Theory and Experiments,"  
 Computers and Security,  Volume 6, Issue 1, pp. 22-35. 
 
[DAF08] Department of the Air Force,  (2008, Mar),  Predictive Battlespace Awareness: 
 Air and Space Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment,  AFP 14-
 118,  Washington:  HQ USAF, 
  http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFPAM14-118.pdf. 
 
[DBM09] M. Davis, S. Bodmer and A. LeMasters,  (2009, Nov),  Hacking Exposed: 
 Malware & Rootkits Secrets & Solutions,  McGraw-Hill, Inc.,  New York,  NY, 
 USA.  
 
[DOD07] Department of Defense,  (2007, Jun),  Joint Intelligence,  Joint Publication 2-0, 
  http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2_0.pdf.  
 
[DOD09] Department of Defense,  (2009, Jun),  Information Assurance and Computer 
 Network Defense Volume I (Incident Handling Program),  Chairman of the Joint 
 Chiefs of Staff Manual 6510.01A, 
  http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m651001_v1.pdf .  
 
[DOJ04]  U.S. Department of Justice,  (2004, Apr),  Forensic Examination of Digital 
 Evidence: A guide for Law Enforcement,  Office of Justice Programs, National 
 Institute of Justice,  Washington, DC., 
  http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf .  
 
[Dru10] D. Drummond,  (2010, Dec),  "A new approach to China,"  The Official Google 
 Blog,  [Online],  Accessed 14 Dec 2010, 
  http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html. 
 
143 
 
[Edg07] K. Edge,  (2007, Jul),  A Framework For Analyzing And Mitigating The 
 Vulnerabilities Of Complex Systems Via Attack And Protection Trees,  Air Force 
 Institute of Technology (AU),  Wright Patterson AFB,  OH, 
 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA472310.  
 
[EkS09] M. Ekstedt and T. Sommestad,  (2009, Mar),  "Enterprise architecture models for 
 cyber security analysis," Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 2009,  PSCE 
 '09,  IEEE/PES ,  pp.1-6, 15-18, doi: 10.1109/PSCE.2009.4840267, 
 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4840267&isnumber=4
839920. 
 
[FMC10] N. Falliere, L. Murchu, and E. Chien,  (2010, Nov),  "W32.Stuxnet  Dossier,"  
 Symantec Security Response,  [Online],  Accessed 14 Dec 2010,  
 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whit
 epapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. 
 
[For07] L. Fortson,  (2007, Mar),  "Towards The Development Of A Defensive Cyber 
 Damage And Mission Impact Methodology,"  MS thesis, AFIT/GIR/ENV/07-
 M9,  School of Engineering and Management,  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 (AU),  Wright-Patterson AFB,  OH, 
 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA467549&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 
[GiM02] J. Giordano and C. Maciag,  (2002),  "Cyber Forensics: A Military Operations 
 Perspective,"  International Journal of Digital Evidence,  Volume  1, Issue 2, 
http://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/publications/articles/A04843F3-
99E5-632B-FF420389C0633B1B.pdf. 
 
[HoL98] J. D. Howard, T. A. Longstaff,  (1998, Oct),  “A Common Language for 
 Computer Security Incidents,”  Technical report, Sandia National Laboratories, 
  www.cert.org/research/taxonomy_988667.pdf. 
 
[Hor99] M. Horony,  (1999, Dec),  Information System Incidents: The Development Of A 
 Damage Assessment Model,  MS thesis,  AFIT/DIR/LAS/99D-5,  School of 
 Engineering and Management,  Air Force Institute of Technology (AU),  Wright 
 Patterson AFB,  OH, 
 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA374167&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 
 [How97] J. D. Howard,  (1997, Apr),  An Analysis Of Security Incidents On The Internet,  
 PhD Dissertation,  Carnegie Mellon University,  Pittsburg,  PA, 
  www.cert.org/archive/pdf/JHThesis.pdf. 
 
144 
 
 [KaP07] D. R. Karrels and G. L. Peterson,  (2007, Nov),  “CyberCraft: Protecting Air 
 Force Electronic Systems with Lightweight Agents,” Vir V. Phoha and S.S. 
 Iyengar (editors), Proceedings of the Cyberspace Research Workshop, pp. 58-62, 
 United  States Air Force, Shreveport, LA. 
 
[Kar05]  Karppinen, K,  (2005),  "Security Measurement Based on Attack Trees in a 
 Mobile Ad Hoc Network Environment,"  [Online],  Accessed 7 Dec 2010,  
 http://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/publications/2005/P580.pdf.   
 
[Kle01] L, Kleen,  (2001, Mar),  Malicious Hackers: A Framework For Analysis,  MS 
 thesis,  AFIT/GOR/ENS/10M-09,  School of Engineering and Management,  Air 
 Force Institute of Technology (AU),  Wright Patterson AFB , OH,  
 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA392952&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 
[LBM93] C. Landwehr, A. Bull, J. McDermott, and W. Choi,  (1993, Nov),  A Taxonomy of 
 Computer Program Security Flaws, with Examples,  Information Technology 
 Division,  Naval Research Laboratory,  Washington,  D. C., 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA274500&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 
[LHS03] S. Lathrop, J. M. D. Hill, and J. R. Surdu,  (2003, May),  "Modeling Network 
 Attacks," 12th Conference On Behavior Representation In Modeling And 
 Simulation (BRIMS 2003), Scottsdale, Arizona, 
  http://www.bucksurdu.com/Professional/Documents/BRIMSMAADNET.pdf. 
 
[Mca10] McAfee,  (2010, Dec),  Operation Aurora,  [Online],  Accessed 7 Dec 2010,  
 http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html. 
 
[MRH10] A, Matrosov, E. Rodionov, D. Harley, and J. Malcho,  (2010, Dec),  "Stuxnet 
 Under the Microscope,"  Revision 1.31,  [Online],  Accessed 7 Dec 2010,   
  http://www.eset.com/resources/white-papers/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf. 
 
[MSK05]  S. McClure, J. Scambray, and G. Kurtz,  (2005),  Hacking Exposed: Network 
 Security Secrets & Solutions, 5th ed., McGraw-Hill/Osborne, Inc., New York, 
 NY, USA.  
 
[NIS06] National Institute of Standards and Technology,  (2006, Aug),  Guide to 
 Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response,  NIST Special 
 Publication 800-86,  Gaithersburg,  MD, 
  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-86/SP800-86.pdf. 
 
  
145 
 
[NIS08] National Institute of Standards and Technology,  (2008, Jul),  Performance 
 Measurement Guide  for Information Security,  NIST Special Publication 800-85 
 Revision 1,  Gaithersburg,  MD, 
  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-55-Rev1/SP800-55-rev1.pdf. 
 
[PoR07] N. Poolsappasit and I. Ray,  (2007),  "Investigating Computer Attacks using 
 Attack Trees,"  Advances in Digital Forensics III,  I FIP,  Volume 242,  pp. 331-
 343,  Springer Boston. 
 
[Sch99] B. Schneier,  (1999, Dec),  "Modeling Security Threats,"  Dr. Dobbs Journal,  
 [Online],  Accessed 9 Dec 2010,   
  http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.html.  
 
[SkL05] E. Skoudis and T. Liston,  (2005),  Counter Hack Reloaded: A Step-By-Step 
 Guide to Computer Attacks and Effective Defenses,  2nd ed.,  Prentice Hall PTR, 
 Upper Saddle River,  NJ,  USA. 
 
[Thi05] L, Thiem,  (2005, Mar),  A study to determine damage assessment methods or 
 models on Air Force networks,  MS thesis, AFIT/GIR/ENV/05M-18,  School of 
 Engineering and Management,  Air Force Institute of Technology (AU),  Wright 
 Patterson AFB,  OH, 
 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435179&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 
[UnP02] J. Undercoffer and J. Pinkston,  (2002, Oct),  Modeling Computer Attacks: A 
 Target-Centric Ontology for Intrusion detection,  Department of Computer 
 Science and Electrical Engineering,  University of Maryland Baltimore County, 
  http://www.cs.umbc.edu/csee/research/cadip/2002Symposium/Ont-for-IDS.pdf. 
  
146 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of 
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 
1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty 
for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
25-03-2011 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master's Thesis 
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Jun 2009 - Mar 2011 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
Defensive Cyber Battle Damage Assessment Through Attack Methodology Modeling 
 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Ryan T. Ostler, Capt, USAF 
 
 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
2950 Hobson Way 
WPAFB, OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
    AFIT/GCO/ENG/11-11 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
REPORT NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
 
 This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
 
14. ABSTRACT  
Due to the growing sophisticated capabilities of advanced persistent cyber threats, it is necessary to understand and accurately 
assess cyber attack damage to digital assets.  This thesis proposes a Defensive Cyber Battle Damage Assessment (DCBDA) 
process which utilizes the comprehensive understanding of all possible cyber attack methodologies captured in a Cyber Attack 
Methodology Exhaustive List (CAMEL).  This research proposes CAMEL to provide detailed knowledge of cyber attack 
actions, methods, capabilities, forensic evidence and evidence collection methods.  This product is modeled as an attack tree 
called the Cyber Attack Methodology Attack Tree (CAMAT).  The proposed DCBDA process uses CAMAT to analyze 
potential attack scenarios used by an attacker.  These scenarios are utilized to identify the associated digital forensic methods 
in CAMEL to correctly collect and analyze the damage from a cyber attack.  The results from the experimentation of the 
proposed DCBDA process show the process can be successfully applied to cyber attack scenarios to correctly assess the extent, 
method and damage caused by a cyber attack 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Battle Damage Assessment, Cyber Attack, Digital Forensics 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
17. LIMITATION OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
    153 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. Barry E. Mullins AFIT/ENG 
REPORT 
U 
ABSTRACT 
U 
c. THIS PAGE 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-3636 x7979 barry.mullins@afit.edu 
Standard Form 298 (Rev: 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
 
